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This dissertation seeks to answer the question: Does pressuring teachers to 
raise their expectations increase student achievement?  Drawing from the sociology of 
education, educational psychology, and the research on accountability systems, the 
author constructs a more comprehensive model of the association between teacher 
expectations, accountability interventions, and student achievement than has been 
offered in prior research.  The author argues that prior research on accountability 
interventions focuses on the direct relationship between accountability testing and 
student achievement, but ignores how teachers mediate this association.  To this end, 
prior research ignores the important role that teachers may play in communicating 
expectations shaped by accountability policies.  
Using data drawn from the Education Longitudinal Study matched to a unique 
state-level accountability dataset, this dissertation offers a systematic assessment of 
how public school teachers respond to accountability interventions with regard to their 
expectations for students.  Findings show that teacher expectations are important 
predictors of student achievement, which is consistent with prior research. What prior 
scholars and policymakers have failed to appreciate, however, is that pressuring 
teachers to raise their expectations has unanticipated and counterproductive 
consequences on the very students the policies are intended to help.  Rather than 
raising their expectations of students, teachers appear to use the information gathered 
 from tests to lower their expectations or even to justify their already low expectations 
of students, especially for low-performing students.  In spite of their lower 
expectations, the association between teacher expectations and student achievement is 
stronger in these states because teachers adjust their expectations of students.  Further 
analysis shows that a student’s race is an important determinant of teacher 
expectations.  Teachers hold black and Hispanic students to lower standards than their 
white and Asian peers, and these low expectations contribute to the achievement gaps 
between white, black, and Hispanic students. 
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This dissertation seeks to answer the question: Does pressuring teachers to 
raise their expectations increase student achievement?  I draw from the sociology of 
education, educational psychology, and the research on accountability systems to 
construct a model that identifies the ways in which accountability interventions affect 
teacher expectations and student achievement.  In the remainder of this chapter, I 
provide a theoretical explanation for the importance of teacher expectations and why 
the narrow focus of the extant research on accountability systems leaves a gap in the 
literature.   
 
TEACHER EXPECTATIONS, STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, AND THE 
INCREASING RELIANCE ON ACCOUNTABILITY TESTING 
 Since the 1940s, sociologists and education scholars have been interested in 
teacher expectations as determinants of student achievement.  Social psychological 
and educational psychological research has been particularly interested in Merton’s 
(1948) concept of a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” which he defines as, “a false definition 
of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception 
come true” (193).  This stream of research investigates questions such as: Does raising 
teacher expectations increase student achievement?  And if so, does increasing teacher 
expectations affect students differently?  At the same time, sociological research has 
also examined the student-teacher relationship extensively.  Together, this research 
offers insight into the dynamics of how teacher expectations are formed and 
communicated to students, as well as how students respond.  Findings 
overwhelmingly suggest that teacher influence matters, but that teachers hold students 
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to different standards and that these differential expectations may not be related to 
student effort and ability (Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey 1998; Downey and Pribesh 
2004; Ferguson 2000; Ferguson 1998; Porter, Floden, Freeman, Schmidt, and Schwille 
1988; Prime and Miranda 2006).  While the evidence suggests consistently that 
teachers hold students to different standards, the extent to which teachers’ low 
expectations contribute to the achievement gap remains unknown after decades of 
research.    
 With the enactment of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2002, studying these 
relationships is more important than ever.  NCLB uses a high-stakes accountability 
system to monitor student achievement and to define achievement expectations.  The 
assumption is that, for many low-performing schools, the mere definition of 
achievement expectations should pressure teachers to raise their own expectations of 
students and put an end to what then-President George W. Bush called the “soft 
bigotry of low expectations.”   
NCLB’s emphasis on accountability is not new to education policy.  Since the 
1970s, all states have taken steps to raise student achievement by defining content 
standards and implementing accountability testing.  For example, starting in 1977, 
Florida required that students pass a minimum competency test to graduate from high 
school.  Florida has since revised its content standards and increased accountability 
standards several times and has also implemented a voucher program that gives 
students in low-performing schools the option to enroll in a better school.  Texas, 
another early adopter, used tests to monitor student progress and required students to 
pass an exit exam in order to graduate.  Texas was one of the first states to use test 
scores to sanction poorly performing schools or reward schools that exceeded 
achievement standards.   
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Kentucky, by contrast, joined the accountability systems movement much 
later, but it did so with rigor when it implemented the 1990 Kentucky Education 
Reform Act (KERA).  Through KERA, Kentucky implemented an accountability 
system that used test scores to monitor student performance on clear state-defined 
content standards and to target teachers, sanctioning those whose students performed 
poorly or otherwise rewarding those whose students surpassed achievement 
expectations.  At the same time, some states used tests for diagnostic purposes only 
(e.g., Iowa) or otherwise deferred to districts to define their own accountability 
standards (e.g., Nebraska).  Over the years, states have revised their achievement 
expectations and testing requirements in response to their own students’ needs as well 
as evidence gathered from other states, yielding a diverse landscape of accountability 
systems.  One important feature of NCLB, then, is that it mandated state-based 
legislation on accountability systems, variability that this project will leverage.  
Evidence of the impact of state-based accountability interventions such as 
these is inconclusive (see Hamilton 2003 for an extensive review).  Some scholars 
claim that accountability interventions raise student test scores (Carnoy and Loeb 
2002; Roderick, Jacob, and Bryk 2002).  Others point out that these gains may be 
driven by increased retention and drop out rates (Darling-Hammond 2003; Warren, 
Jenkins, and Kulick 2006), as well as increased rates of students enrolled in special 
education, where they are likely to be exempt from testing requirements (Amrein-
Beardsley and Berliner 2003; Figlio and Getzler 2006).   
In this dissertation, I argue that the research on accountability interventions 
fails to understand the association between accountability interventions and student 
achievement because it ignores the importance of teachers.  The success of 
accountability interventions is dependent, in part, upon teachers adjusting their 
expectations in response to state provisions and then successfully communicating 
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them to students.  In suggesting that expectations should be uniform and high, 
accountability systems implicitly discourage teachers from adjusting expectations to 
the specific features of students, real or inferred.  Most research on accountability 
systems focuses on the direct relationship between accountability testing and student 
achievement, but ignores how teachers mediate this association.  Researchers who 
examine the impact of accountability interventions on student achievement thus 
impose one of two assumptions: (1) that students respond directly to accountability 
expectations and teachers are not important mediators; or (2) that the findings are 
indirect evidence of teacher effectiveness.  In either case, such studies ignore the 
important role that teachers may play in communicating expectations shaped by 
accountability policies. 
My dissertation seeks to fill this gap in the literature while also addressing the 
literature on teacher expectation effects: Does pressuring teachers to raise their 
expectations increase student achievement?  Using data drawn from the Education 
Longitudinal Study matched to a unique state-level accountability dataset that I 
constructed, I use advanced quantitative methods to examine (1) the association 
between teacher expectations and student achievement, (2) how accountability 
interventions impact the student-teacher relationship, and (3) how accountability 
systems do or do not contribute to eliminating the race achievement gap. 
 
OVERVIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS 
 Chapter 2 introduces the data used to answer my research questions.  I argue 
that prior research on accountability interventions is limited because it employs data 
that focus specifically on the association between accountability testing and student 
outcomes.  For this dissertation, I draw the primary data from the 2002, 2004, and 
2006 waves of the Education Longitudinal Study (ELS).  The ELS is a large, 
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nationally representative dataset that follows a cohort of tenth grade students enrolled 
in public and private schools during the 2001-02 academic school year.  The 2002 
base-year wave includes seven components: questionnaires completed by the student, 
parent, math teacher, English teacher, school administrator, and librarian; and included 
a school facilities checklist.  Together, these questionnaire components provide rich 
information about students and their teachers, schools and communities.  The data also 
include results for high-quality achievement tests, enabling analysis of the effects of 
teacher expectations on student achievement.   
The ELS data are matched to a unique state-level accountability systems 
dataset that I compiled using information from each state department of education and 
other sources.  The dataset that I constructed focuses not on the impact of sanctions 
and rewards on student achievement, as does much of the extant research, but on the 
type of information states collect in their accountability systems.  This allows me to 
explore how information type affects teacher expectations of students and the effects 
of those expectations on student achievement.  These data, when linked to ELS data, 
allow me to evaluate heretofore untested hypotheses and assumptions about the 
relationship between accountability standards and student outcomes, as well as how 
teachers respond and adjust to expectations standards.   
In Chapter 3, I address a classic question in the sociology of education and in 
the current policy environment: Do teachers influence achievement by communicating 
expectations to students?  Increasing evidence suggests that teacher expectations of 
students’ future educational attainment matter, but the association is affected by the 
context in which students and teachers interact.  I construct a more comprehensive 
model of the association between math teacher expectations and student achievement 
in math than has been offered in prior research.  [Consistent with other research, I 
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analyze math because, unlike reading, standardized tests are a more reliable measure 
of student achievement.] 
I first identify the determinants of teacher expectations of students’ future 
educational attainment, and then examine the association between teacher expectations 
and student performance.  I show that although student characteristics are the most 
important determinants of teacher expectations, teacher characteristics and school 
composition mediate how teachers perceive students.  I then show that teacher 
expectations are strongly associated with math test scores and enrollment status in 
2004 (i.e., graduate on time, held back a grade, or dropped out), net of the 
determinants of teacher expectations.   
 Chapter 4 examines how teachers respond to state-level pressure to raise their 
expectations.  To date, research focuses primarily on the direct impact of 
accountability interventions on student achievement.  There is some research that 
examines how teachers respond to accountability interventions, but not how teachers 
then communicate accountability expectations to students.  Findings from this research 
suggest that teachers tend to strongly oppose the use of tests as a means of measuring 
student achievement because state-level standards interfere with their teaching 
agendas.  However, although tests are intended for use as direct measures of student 
achievement, they are also indicators of teacher effectiveness, and therefore may be 
threatening to teachers.  Findings from research on accountability systems indicate 
that the more pressure teachers feel to meet expectations, the more likely they are to 
compromise or adjust their teaching plans in order to prepare students for the tests 
(Stecher, Barron, Chun, and Ross 2000).   
Even if teachers do not believe that tests are necessary to monitor student 
attainment, tests can still considered to be used to help teachers identify students in 
need of additional help (Shepard and Dougherty 1991).  Furthermore, attaching 
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sanctions to test scores introduces an incentive for teachers and students to want to 
perform well.  Accordingly, whereas prior research focuses primarily on the impact of 
sanctions and rewards on student achievement, I focus more attention on how the type 
of information gathered affects teachers’ influence on students.  I address three 
questions: (1) How do teachers respond to accountability interventions? (2) Do 
teachers communicate these expectations to students? and (3) What are the 
consequences for student learning for low- and high-performing students?  
I show that teachers respond adversely to accountability expectations, such that 
stronger accountability systems lead teachers to decrease, rather than increase, their 
expectations of students.  I also show that there is little evidence of an accountability 
effect on student achievement or teachers effectively communicating accountability 
expectations to students.  I posit that teachers selectively adjust their expectations, 
such that they more strongly predict student achievement for low-performing students 
than for high-performing students.  I show that, in states with strong accountability 
interventions, the lowest performing students are subject to particularly low teacher 
expectations.  In other words, teachers appear to calibrate their expectations of low-
performing students so that they are more realistic, or less hopeful.  To this end, I 
maintain that low-performing students who adopt their teachers’ low expectations as 
their own suffer from the “harsh reality of diminished expectations” rather than the 
“soft bigotry of low expectations.”  
 Chapter 5 speaks to education policymakers’ concern that teachers hold black 
and Hispanic students to lower standards than they do white students.  A primary goal 
of accountability systems is to pressure teachers to raise their expectations of 
traditionally low-performing groups, especially black and Hispanic students.  Indeed 
these accountability systems are often justified with reference to the black-white test 
score gap, one of the most extensively studied group differences in education research 
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and a perennial concern of education policymakers.  The Hispanic-white gap is now 
attracting a growing amount of scholarly interest.  Overall, findings from this research 
suggest that teachers tend to hold black and Hispanic students to lower standards than 
they do their white and Asian peers, which some argue contributes to the achievement 
gap.   
In this chapter, I argue that student race does in fact determine teacher 
expectations and that the ways in which teachers mediate accountability expectations 
differs by student race.  I show that teacher expectations are lowest for black and 
Hispanic students, even after taking into account prior academic performance.  I also 
show that student race affects how teachers respond to accountability testing 
information.  I argue that the findings presented in this chapter suggest that student 
race should not be overlooked when considering how teachers communicate 
accountability expectations to students.   
 Chapter 6 summarizes the findings from the three empirical chapters and 
discusses the policy implications of increasing reliance on accountability testing.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The primary objectives of this dissertation are to model the association 
between teacher expectations and student achievement (e.g., math test scores, as well 
as the likelihood being held back a grade, dropping out of school, or graduating on 
time), and to investigate whether teachers respond to state-level pressure to raise their 
expectations of students.  This chapter describes the sources of data used to answer my 
research questions.   
 
DATA 
Education Longitudinal Study 
The student-level data were drawn from the 2002, 2004, and 2006 waves of the 
Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS), which is sponsored by the National 
Center for Educational Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education.  The ELS uses 
a two-stage sampling method that first randomly selects public and private high 
schools and then randomly selects a within-school sample of high school sophomores.  
The result is a nationally representative sample of 15,244 tenth grade students enrolled 
in 751 public and private high schools during the 2001-02 academic year.1  The base-
year respondents were then followed and resurveyed in the spring of 2004 and again in 
2006, with future follow-up waves scheduled.  
For the 2002 base-year wave, questionnaires were distributed to students as 
well as a parent, math teacher, English teacher, school administrator, librarian, and a 
school facilities checklist.  Collectively, the questionnaires provide rich information 
                                                        
1 Two respondents who participated in the 2002 base-year wave sample were subsequently removed 
from the sample for the follow-up data. 
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about the students, their schools and the communities in which they live, thus making 
the ELS an ideal source of data to investigate the student-teacher relationship.   
The 2004 wave (or first follow-up) was conducted during the spring semester 
of the 2003-04 academic school year.2  Whereas the base-year wave gathered 
information from seven different sources, the first follow-up wave gathered 
information primarily from students and school administrators.  All students 
completed a student questionnaire similar to the base-year wave student questionnaire.  
Students who were a part of the freshened sample and base-year wave respondents 
whose enrollment status changed between the 2002 and 2004 waves (i.e., they dropped 
out, graduated early, were homeschooled, or transferred schools) were administered a 
specialized questionnaire component specific to their 2004 enrollment status.  
For the 2006 wave (or second follow-up), most respondents had graduated 
from high school and were enrolled in college, but some were still enrolled in high 
school or were in the labor market.  The 2006 questionnaire included four subsections 
(i.e., high school, postsecondary education, employment, and community), which 
makes it possible to track the respondents to their respective destinations over time.  
 
State-Level Accountability Interventions 
Whereas the ELS data provide rich information about students and their 
teachers, the accountability testing information is limited and sparse.  For the base-
year wave, school administrators were asked a variety of questions about                                                         
2 In addition to the base-year wave participants, the first follow-up wave includes an additional random 
sample of 953 twelfth grade students drawn from within the base-year wave schools.  The additional 
sample of students includes students who (1) were eligible and did not participate in the base-year wave 
(N = 649), (2) were ineligible during the base-year wave but became eligible during the 2004 wave (N = 
126), or (3) were enrolled in the twelfth grade in the spring of 2004 (N = 178).  The addition of the 
freshened sample makes the 2004 wave nationally representative of students enrolled in the twelfth 
grade in 2004.  Accordingly, the ELS may be used for either longitudinal or cross-sectional purposes.  
The sample of freshened students is not included in my analysis sample because it does not have teacher 
information, which was gathered during the base-year wave. 
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accountability testing in their schools.3  I do not use this information because there is 
too much missing information and variation across schools and between states to 
construct a complete dataset of 2001-02 accountability system requirements for the 
schools that participated in the base-year wave.  Therefore, using information I 
gathered from each state department of education as well as several additional sources, 
I constructed a new dataset that captures a variety of the 2001-02 state accountability 
system characteristics for all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  [See Chapter 4 
for a more detailed discussion of the testing movement and issues associated with 
modeling the impact of accountability interventions on teacher expectations and 
student achievement.] 
Implementation.  The first variable identifies the states that were early 
participants in the movement to use tests to monitor student achievement, either for 
assessment or accountability purposes.  Tests have been used for over a century, but it 
was not until the 1980s that they started to gain legitimacy as a means of holding 
students accountable to state-defined achievement expectations (Hamilton 2003; Linn 
2000).  By the late 1990s, most states had implemented an accountability system, and 
the few that did not have since followed suit in accord with NCLB requirements.  
Using information drawn from the Office of Technology Assessment (1992), I 
constructed a variable that identifies the states that were early to implement an 
accountability system as opposed to those that were late to implement, where early 
                                                        
3 The base-year wave questionnaire asked school administrators a series of questions pertaining to the 
use of competency tests.  In particular, they were asked if competency tests were administered for 
grades 8 though 12 the grade levels.  If yes, administrators were then asked to identify which subjects 
were tested for each grade—i.e., math, English, science, and history/social studies (BYA33AA-
BYA33FE), and if the competency tests were state, district, or school requirements (BYA34).  
Administrators were also asked if the competency tests were aligned to content standards or curriculum 
(BYA35), the percentage of students who failed the test (i.e., scores were not proficient) in any or all of 
the subject areas on their first attempt (BYA36).  Finally, administrators were asked whether students 
who failed any test were permitted to retake the test and/or were offered educational support programs 
to help them pass the test (BYA37A-BYA37F). 
 12 
implementers are defined as having an accountability system prior to 1992.4  Evidence 
suggests that test scores increase upon the introduction of accountability expectations, 
but the effect decreases over time as accountability expectations gain legitimacy and 
the fear of sanctions decreases (Hanushek and Raymond 2003).  Both students and 
teachers make initial adjustments to newly defined expectations, but once the 
expectations become more legitimized or realistic, accountability systems lose their 
impact.  
Testing Characteristics.  Before states administer assessments, they must first 
decide what it is that they want to assess or measure.  States determine the type of tests 
they use, what grades and subjects to test students, and whether to attach sanctions to 
performance.  I gathered 2001-02 state and school report cards from each state 
department of education website, including the District of Columbia.  If report card 
data were not readily available, I requested them via email contact or phone.  For each 
grade, I extracted information about the subject tested, the type of test administered—
i.e., norm-referenced tests (NRT), criterion-referenced tests (CRT), or performance 
assessment tests (PAT)—and whether the test was a required exit exam.  Although I 
gathered information for grades k-12, I restricted the data for this project to testing 
requirements for grades 9 to 12 because I am most interested in the impact of state-
level testing on teacher expectations from the ELS.5 
I then constructed a series of key variables that capture state-defined testing 
requirements for k-12 for the 2001-02 academic school year.  Four dichotomous 
                                                        
4 The OTA (1992) is one of the earliest reports assessing the adoption of state accountability systems 
and is frequently cited in the accountability systems literature.  For a more descriptive review of the 
adoption of assessment/accountability systems, see Linn (2000).    
5 I tested the accuracy of the accountability variables by comparing the information I gathered to 
information gathered by the Council of Chief State School Officers (2002) and Carnoy and Loeb 
(2002), both of which offer similar information for the 2000-01 academic school year, and exit exam 
information was compared to testing information available at the Minnesota Population Center website 
(http://www.hsee.umn.edu/). 
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variables identify the types of tests that states used between grades 9 and 12: (1) NRTs, 
(2) CRTs, (3) PATs, and/or (4) exit exams at any point between grades 9 and 12.6  I use 
these variables to assess how testing rigor affects teachers and students.  Four 
additional variables capture the number of years students are tested in mathematics, 
English, science, and history/social studies, ranging from 0 to 4 years.  From these 
four variables, I constructed an index of the frequency of testing within each state.  
The resultant index has a Cronbach’s α of .87, which is quite strong under statistical 
terms (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).  I then matched the state-level accountability 
data that I constructed with the ELS data, creating a unique dataset that allows me to 
model the association between accountability interventions, teacher expectations, and 
student achievement.   
 
Analysis Sample 
I introduced three restrictions to the data to construct my analysis sample.  
First, I restricted the base-year wave sample to respondents who participated in the 
2004 follow-up wave, which reduces the sample from 15,244 to 15,236 students.7  
Second, I restricted the sample to students who were enrolled in public school, 
because private schools are not required to comply with the same state accountability 
requirements (N = 11,961).  Third, I restricted the sample to respondents whose math 
teacher completed a questionnaire and have valid information for the primary 
explanatory variable, math teacher expectations.  The resulting analytic sample 
contains 8,945 students enrolled in 561 schools. 
                                                        
6 A state is defined as an exit exam state if, as of the 2001-02 academic school year, it required the 
graduating class of 2003-04 to pass an exit exam.   
7 Of the 35 base-year wave respondents removed from the sample, 21 were deceased and another14 
were institutionalized at the time that the first follow-up was conducted.  
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For the models where the outcome variable is drawn from the first follow-up 
(i.e., models where the outcome variable is either twelfth grade math test or math test 
score gains), I restricted the sample to respondents who were enrolled in the twelfth 
grade and in the same school as in the base-year wave (N = 6,776 students enrolled in 
555 schools).  Finally, for the models where the outcome variable is one of the three 
enrollment status variables (i.e., graduate on time, held back a grade, or dropped out), 
I restricted the sample to students using enrollment status information drawn from the 
second follow-up (N = 8,611 students enrolled in 561 schools).  Finally, I use best-
subset regression imputation for all missing information and, because these are non-
random samples of public school students, I use adjustment weights so that the 
findings may be interpreted as representative of public school students (see Appendix 
A for a discussion of the steps used for imputation and weight construction). 
 
High School Versus Elementary School Students 
 The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy requires that states test all students 
annually in grades 3 through 8 and at least once again in high school.  For this 
dissertation, I employ high school-level data rather than elementary-level data for 
several reasons.  First, scholars have directed more attention to the association 
between accountability interventions and high school student performance, largely 
because there are more consequences for poor performance at the high school level, 
especially in terms of the transition to the labor market and post-secondary schooling.  
The emphasis on the transition beyond high school is grounded in the era of minimum 
competency testing, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4.  Second, I focus on 
high school students because research suggests that elementary school children are 
extremely impressionable to teacher expectations (Brenner and Mistry 2007; 
Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968), and therefore teacher effects may be inflated.  High 
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school students, on the other hand, are less impressionable because they have adjusted 
their expectations as they have moved through school.   
 
Construct Validity of State Accountability Characteristics 
How can I be sure that the accountability system characteristics I use are valid 
measures that capture the nature of each state’s testing system?  Research on 
accountability systems is accumulating rapidly, and with each new study scholars 
learn more about the problems associated with identifying causal effects.  Prior studies 
typically use one of two approaches.  The first is a pre-test/post-test study design to 
identify achievement gains associated with the implementation of accountability 
systems.  The second examines the relationship between accountability characteristics 
(e.g., report cards or exit exams) and student achievement, where coefficients are 
interpreted as the direct effect of accountability testing on student achievement.  While 
both approaches offer estimates of the achievement gains associated with 
accountability systems, they do not address the heterogeneity of accountability 
systems, and must therefore be interpreted with caution.  Further complicating matters 
is the lack of available data to effectively analyze accountability interventions.  Many 
studies match accountability characteristics to data drawn from national datasets, such 
as the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP), while others use the single 
case-study method to examine the achievement gains associated with implementation.  
In either case, the accountability literature focuses on how testing directly affects 
students, therein bypassing teachers.  
This dissertation expands research on accountability systems by using a 
different source of data and by examining a different set of characteristics.  When 
implementing accountability systems, states must decide what it is that they want to 
know.  By way of modeling the type of tests administered (e.g., NRTs, CRTs, or 
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PATs), I am able to construct conclusions about how the type of information that 
states gather impacts teacher expectations.  For example, NRTs are used to compare 
students to peers, while CRTs are used as indicators of how well students master core 
curriculum.  PATs have similar goals, but are more complex estimates of student 
performance.  I also examine the impact of testing rigor and exit exams in addition to 




TEACHER EXPECTATIONS AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: REVISITING 
A CLASSIC QUESTION 
 
 In this chapter, I address a classic question in the sociology of education: Do 
teachers influence achievement by communicating expectations to students?  I first 
introduce the foundations of expectations research in both sociology and educational 
psychology.  I then discuss the teacher expectations literature more narrowly and 
introduce a heuristic model of the determinants of teacher expectations and student 
achievement that integrates psychological and sociological models.  Then, using the 
Education Longitudinal Study of 2002, I address two research questions.  First, what 
factors predict teacher expectations of students’ future educational attainment?  
Second, net of these predictors, how strong are teacher expectations of student 
educational attainment, where attainment is a measure of math test scores and 
enrollment status in 2004? 
  
THE LEGACY OF PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM 
Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson’s (1968) Pygmalion in the Classroom 
was the first real-life psychology experiment that tested the self-fulfilling prophecy for 
student achievement.  In their study, Rosenthal and Jacobson administered an 
intelligence test called the “Harvard Test of Inflated Acquisition” to all children 
enrolled in kindergarten through grade 5 in a low-income public school.  The test was 
administered as a pre-test to measure student ability, but teachers were led to believe 
that it was a strong predictor of future “spurts” of learning (Rosenthal and Jacobson 
1968:66).  Rosenthal and Jacobson then selected a random sample of students and told 
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the teachers these students were expected to be “late bloomers” who would make 
larger-than-normal achievement gains over the next year. 
When students were retested at the end of the year, Rosenthal and Jacobson 
found that the late bloomers showed greater achievement gains than their peers.  A 
more careful analysis revealed that achievement gains were largest among the first and 
second grade bloomers, which the authors attributed to the fact that younger children 
are more sensitive to teachers’ influence.  Rosenthal and Jacobson also explored 
behavioral differences and found that teachers were more approving of the bloomers, 
especially when they showed signs of achievement gains.  In contrast, teachers 
responded negatively when the non-bloomer students’ achievement gains were larger 
than anticipated.  In other words, teachers responded positively when their 
expectations were confirmed (i.e., high achieving bloomers) and negatively when they 
were disconfirmed (i.e., high achieving non-bloomers).  Rosenthal and Jacobson 
argued that teachers adjusted their behavior toward students according to their new 
expectations, thus producing a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Rosenthal and Jacobson 
concluded:  
 
… we may say that by what she said, by how and when she said it, by her 
facial expressions, postures, and perhaps by her touch, the teacher may have 
communicated to the children of the experimental group that she expected 
improved intellectual performance.  Such communications together with 
possible changes in teacher techniques may have helped the child learn by 
changing his self concept, his expectations of his own behavior, and his 
motivation, as well as his cognitive style and skills.  (1968:180) 
 
The Pygmalion in the Classroom findings were received with both curiosity 
and speculation.  Immediately following its publication, both social psychologists and 
educational psychologists embarked upon a rigorous investigation to assess the 
validity of Rosenthal and Jacobson’s findings.  Educational and social psychologists 
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approached the Pygmalion findings with different perspectives: educational 
psychologists were more skeptical of the power of teacher expectations, whereas 
social psychologists embraced the self-fulfilling prophecy (Jussim and Harber 2005). 
In their extensive review of the previous 35 years of research, Jussim and 
Harber (2005) present a convincing case that the Pygmalion effects are genuine, 
arguing that previous research was unable to replicate Rosenthal and Jacobson’s 
(1968) controversial findings because of the popularity of the study and because of a 
failure to accurately replicate Pygmalion’s study design.  They also argue that, firstly, 
the self-fulfilling prophecy does exist, but that the size of the effect of teacher 
expectations on student achievement tends to be small and is more likely to decrease 
rather than increase over time (Jussim 1989; Jussim and Eccles 1992; Smith, Jussim, 
and Eccles 1999).  Second, they argue that self-fulfilling prophecies are more likely to 
occur among socially stigmatized groups because the stereotypes to which they are 
associated are, by definition, typically inaccurate.  Teachers’ perceptions of white and 
black students differed not because of the associated stereotypes, but rather because 
they were closely associated with past achievement (Jussim, Eccles, and Madon 
1996).  Nevertheless, Jussim and Harber argue that these differences in perceptions are 
indicative of a slight stereotype bias.  Third, they acknowledge the association 
between teacher expectations and student achievement, but warn that making 
conclusions about whether teacher expectations actually increase (or decrease) student 
intelligence is beyond available evidence.  And fourth, they argue that teacher 
expectations predict student achievement because they are accurate assessments of 
student achievement, which is the perspective maintained by the educational 
psychologists (Jussim 1989; Jussim and Eccles 1992; Jussim et al. 1996).  In sum, 
teacher expectancy effects are important predictors of student achievement, but not 
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necessarily self-fulfilling in that they cause large achievement gains, as theorized by 
Merton (1948).  
 
THE WISCONSIN MODEL: THE INFLUENCE OF PARENTS, TEACHERS, 
AND PEERS COMPARED 
Sociologists have been interested in the student-teacher relationship since at 
least the mid-1940s.  One stream of research, best exemplified by Sewell, Haller, and 
Portes (1969), integrates social psychological and social structural explanations into a 
model of achievement that gives primacy to the importance of social influence.  Figure 
3.1 presents the educational attainment portion of the model of Sewell and colleagues 
(hereafter the “Wisconsin model”).  As shown in the figure, a student’s prior academic 
performance is determined by mental ability and factors that generate the association 
between socioeconomic status and mental ability.  The Wisconsin model posits that 
student aspirations are not just a function of student characteristics, but of the 
perceptions of parents, teachers, and peers, which is in turn affected by academic 
performance and socioeconomic status.  Parents, teachers, and peers’ influence (what 
they call “significant others’ influence”) are expectations about future educational 
attainment that are communicated to students through social interactions, which then 
influence students’ own academic aspirations and, in turn, their future educational and 
occupational attainment.  
Immediately following its publication, the Wisconsin model was criticized for 
being too simplistic and underwent many revisions (see Morgan 2005 for a review).  
The biggest issue was the generalizability of the theoretical model, given that the data 




Figure 3.1: Nested Path-Model of the Educational Attainment Portion of the 
Wisconsin Model 
Source: Sewell, Haller, and Portes (1969) 
 
Study of 1957.  The Wisconsin model hypothesis was later tested using both a broader 
sample of students and longitudinal data (Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf 1970), with 
much the same results.  Although the authors amended the model by adding three 
additional paths, they still endorsed the ideas of the original Wisconsin model.  After 
reviewing the Wisconsin model research, Sewell and Hauser (1980) concluded that a 
path could be drawn from each of the predictors of significant other's influence 
directly to educational and occupational achievement.  Whether communicated 
verbally or via the subtleties of social interactions, parents, teachers, and peers are 
powerful agents who have the ability to influence individuals’ own educational and 
career goals.  In fact, perceptions may also be influenced by shared cultural beliefs, 
which lead to biased self-assessments of ability, therein channeling individuals into 
different career paths (Correll 2001).  
Significant others’ influence on individual students varies according to 
relationship to the student.  Parents, for example, play the role of authority figures 
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whose influence is oftentimes motivated by their own experiences and consequential 
aspirations for their children (Lareau 2003).  Peers, on the other hand, act as role 
models to whom individuals compare themselves.  Preceding the Wisconsin model by 
only a few years, James S. Coleman’s (1961) The Adolescent Society: The Social Life 
of the Teenager and its Impact on Education is one of the first examples of how much 
weight peer influence has on students.  He states, 
 
… our adolescents today are cut off, probably more than ever before, from the 
adult society.  They are still oriented toward fulfilling their parents’ desires, 
but they look very much to their peers for approval as well.  Consequently, our 
society has within its midst a set of small teen-age societies, which focus teen-
age interests and attitudes on things far removed from adult responsibilities, 
and which may develop standards that lead away from those goals established 
by the larger society. (Coleman 1961:9) 
 
Although The Adolescent Society was published nearly sixty years ago, Coleman’s 
theoretical framework continues to influence the ways in which scholars think about 
the importance of social influence, and how it is partially determined by the context in 
which individuals interact.  
Recent research explores the ways in which peers influence each other 
academically.  Crosnoe, Cavanagh, and Elder (2003), for example, find that students 
whose close friends value school or are good students are more likely to value school 
themselves.  However, not all students respond similarly to their peers.  In their study 
of the relationship between same-sex friendships and achievement, Riegle-Crumb, 
Farkas, and Muller (2006) find that young women are more responsive than young 
men to same-sex friends’ academic achievement.  That is, same-sex friends’ 
achievement increases the likelihood of enrolling in advanced math and science 
courses for young women, but not for young men.  Peer influence—and parent and 
teacher influence to a lesser extent—continues to be an important resource at even the 
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higher education level (Bank, Slavings, and Biddle 1990).  These studies suggest that 
students gravitate toward peers with similar interests, and that such ties also act as a 
source of motivation.  
Teachers’ influence, on the other hand, is restricted to the classroom setting, 
where teachers monitor students closely and direct them as needed.  As a result, 
teacher expectations are influenced by their observations of student effort and 
performance, which they then communicate to students via constructive feedback and 
in social interactions with students.  Teachers who feel responsible for student learning 
interact with students more frequently, thus increasing learning opportunities (Lee and 
Smith 1996).    
Compared to parents and peers, teacher influence differs because teachers are 
responsible for motivating students to meet defined achievement expectations for 
which students are rewarded with grades and feedback.  The more positively students 
perceive their teachers (e.g., teachers were caring and provided positive feedback) the 
more likely they are to be academically engaged (Hallinan 2008).  Although teacher 
expectations are not positively associated with students liking school, students are 
perceptive of their teachers’ behavior toward them (Hallinan 2008). 
 So far, I have introduced the psychological and sociological foundations of the 
expectations literature.  Next, I discuss findings from the teacher expectations research 
more narrowly and present a heuristic model of teacher expectations that builds upon 
previous research in that it suggests that teacher expectations are also a function of 
context. 
 
The Student-Teacher Relationship and the Importance of Context 
Sociological research has examined the student-teacher relationship 
extensively, especially in the context of the black-white test score gap.  Findings from 
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this research show that teachers are more likely to perceive black students as being 
less academically engaged and more disruptive than their white peers (Ainsworth-
Darnell and Downey 1998), which may be a function of white teacher bias (Downey 
and Pribesh 2004).  Some researchers also claim that teachers are not only more likely 
to have less confidence in black students’ ability to learn difficult material (Prime and 
Miranda 2006) but also more likely to attribute learning to external forces rather than 
student ability (Wiley and Eskilson 1978) and spend less time and effort instructing 
black and Hispanic students than white students (Porter et al. 1988).  Teachers do not 
need to interact with students to construct expectations.  In fact, they may associate 
student characteristics such as race or social class with social stereotypes.  Something 
as simple as having a stereotypically black name can trigger teachers to lower their 
expectations (Figlio 2005).  If teachers’ differential treatment is not necessarily a 
function of student ability, how much does teacher influence matter?  In order to 
answer this question, it is first important to understand what factors influence teacher 
expectations.   
Teacher expectations for a given student are primarily driven by that student’s 
background and ability (Alexander, Entwisle, and Bedinger 1994; Ferguson 2000; 
Harvey and Slatin 1975; Jussim et al. 1996).  Teachers may also associate higher or 
lower ability with status characteristics, such as student race or gender (Correll and 
Ridgeway 2003).  Teachers who adhere to such stereotypes are particularly harmful 
influences because their biased assessments in turn obstruct students’ own aspirations 
(Ferguson 2000; Shepardson and Pizzini 1992).  However, assuming that teachers are 
not averse to amending their assessments of students, the more often student 
performance exceeds teachers’ expectations, the more likely teachers will revise their 
expectations such that they are consistent with a student’s average performance.  As a 
result, teacher expectations are more likely to be accurate assessments of student 
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achievement (Brophy and Good 1974; Jussim 1989; Jussim and Eccles 1992; Jussim 
et al. 1996).  
In the classroom, teachers evaluate students by comparing them to their peers 
and by considering their own experiences.  For instance, teachers’ own race may 
influence their perceptions of students, although evidence is mixed.  Ehrenberg, 
Goldhaber, and Brewer (1985) argue that the match between student and teacher race 
and gender affects how teachers perceive students, but the student-teacher race match 
it is not associated with how much students actually learn.  Babad (1985), on the other 
hand, argues that teachers’ ethnicity does not bias expectations of students.  More 
recently, Downey and Pribesh (2004) examined the student-teacher race match and 
found evidence that black teachers at the elementary and middle school levels tend to 
rate black students more favorably than white teachers rated white students.  Downey 
and Pribesh argue that white teachers’ more negative perceptions of black students is 
evidence of teacher bias rather than the black students exhibiting behaviors consistent 
with the oppositional culture argument because the findings are consistent for both 
elementary and middle school students. 
Teacher quality may also affect the ways in which teachers and students 
interact.  Teachers who have the proper training and certification are more sufficient at 
identifying and adapting to student needs (Hansen 1988), which in turn is associated 
with increased student learning (Bidwell and Kasarda 1975).  Darling-Hammond, 
Berry, and Thoreson (2001) on the other hand, argue that certification does not matter 
because most teachers have qualifications that resemble certification.  Moreover, 
teachers with advanced degrees are not always the most dedicated to their jobs (Riehl 
and Sipple 1996).  In their analysis of the effects of licensure tests, Angrist and 
Guryan (2008) find no evidence of increased teacher quality.  If anything, they find 
that state certification requirements are associated with an increase in salary.  Given 
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that the students in most need of such attention are more likely to be low-income and 
black or Hispanic and are also more likely to attend schools with less qualified 
teachers (Jordan, Mendro, and Weerasinghe 1997), state certification requirements 
may actually steer better teachers away from the students in most need.     
The social dynamics of the student-teacher relationship are further complicated 
by the fact that teacher expectations are also a function of the environment in which 
teachers observe students.  For example, the school size literature argues that larger 
schools are better equipped to address student needs because they can sort students 
into achievement groups (Lee and Loeb 2000; Lee and Smith 1995, 1997).  At the 
same time, low performing students in small schools benefit from higher average 
expectations because their schools are small and therefore are less likely to sort 
students according to performance.  Within the classroom, teachers interact differently 
with low- and high-expectancy students, which contributes to the achievement gap 
(Cooper and Tom 1984).  Teachers tend to direct more attention at and provide more 
positive feedback to high-expectancy students (Brophy and Good 1970; Cooper 1979; 
Dusek 1975), while they give less attention and more critical feedback to low-
expectancy students (Cooper 1979).  Such differential treatment is particularly harmful 
when students adopt their teachers’ expectations as their aspirations, especially if 
teachers do not update their expectations when they are disconfirmed (Jussim 1989).   
Expectations are also manifested at the community level (Kozol 1991).  
Schools surrounded by poverty are more likely to have high rates of at-risk students, 
who are also more likely to be black and Hispanic.  Teachers struggle to address 
behavioral issues, thus leaving less time to complete lesson plans.  As a result, 
students fall behind their more affluent counterparts.  Even if teachers aspire to make a 
difference in students’ lives, their ambitions cannot compete with cultural 
expectations, and they lower their expectations accordingly.  
 27 
The more that research uncovers about the complexity of the student-teacher 
relationship the more apparent it is that teachers’ perceptions of students are a function 
of their academic environment (Prime and Miranda 2006).  In order to understand how 
teachers influence students, one must first identify the student characteristics as well 
as the teacher and school characteristics that influence teacher expectations.   
 
An Integrative Model of Teacher Expectations and Student Achievement  
Figure 3.2 integrates social psychological and sociological models of 
attainment into a heuristic model of the observed determinants of teacher expectations 
and student achievement.  In reality, the student-teacher relationship is much more 
complex, with many more causes and causal pathways that are not represented in the 
figure.  This complexity will be reflected in the models presented in the results 
section; Figure 3.2 shows only the most crucial relationships. 
In Figure 3.2, math teacher expectations and student achievement are a 
function of student characteristics (e.g., prior academic performance, race, and 
socioeconomic status), teacher characteristics (e.g., teachers’ race, gender, and 
teaching experience), and school characteristics (e.g., percent of students who are 
minority, eligible for free lunch, and enrolled in the college preparatory track).  [We 
can for now ignore the dashed line between math teacher expectations and past 
academic performance.]  Teacher expectations, which are a function of student 
characteristics, school characteristics, and teacher characteristics, directly influence 
future academic performance.  In addition to teacher expectations, future academic 
performance is a direct function of student characteristics and past academic 
performance.  School characteristics indirectly influence student achievement by way 




Figure 3.2: A Heuristic Model of the Observed Determinants of Teacher Expectations 
and Student Achievement 
  
Even though Figure 3.2 suggests that teachers’ influence on students is more 
complex than as presented in the Wisconsin model in Figure 3.1, the same ideas apply.  
Teachers use information about students to construct expectations, which they then 
communicate to students.  In the model, teachers form initial impressions of students 
using knowledge about students, but also take into account their own experiences and 
the context in which they interact (i.e., school characteristics).  Both teacher and 
school characteristics influence teacher expectations to the extent that teachers 
compare students to their peers.  Teachers’ initial expectations influence the ways in 
which they interact with students, which in turn influence student behavior (presented 
as past academic performance in Figure 3.2).  Student behavior is also influenced by 
students’ own characteristics as well as their school characteristics.  Note that there is 
no direct causal path from teacher characteristics to student behavior.  Instead, teacher 
characteristics influence student behavior through teachers’ initial expectations.  With 














such that the more frequently teachers interact with students the more frequently they 
update their expectations (Braun 1976). 
Before introducing the results, I would like to first define how teacher 
expectations are operationalized in this dissertation.  The public discourse used to 
describe teacher expectations does not make a clear distinction between teachers’ 
short-term (i.e., daily, weekly, or yearly) performance expectations and forecasts of 
future educational attainment.  Whereas the former refer to performance on specific 
tasks, the latter are predictions of educational attainment.  
For this dissertation, I define teacher expectations as a teacher’s expectations 
for a given student’s future educational attainment.  I focus on teachers’ forecasts of 
students’ educational attainment for two reasons.  First, the data employed in this 
dissertation do not offer information that allows me to model the short-term 
association between teacher expectations and student performance.  They do, however, 
provide a measure of teachers’ futuristic expectations.  In particular, for the base-year 
wave of the Education Longitudinal Study (ELS), a teacher questionnaire was 
administered a math and English teacher for each student participant.  Teachers were 
asked, “How far in school do you expect this student to get?”  Responses range from 
“Less than high school graduation only” to “Will obtain a Doctorate, professional 
degree, or other advanced degree (Ph.D., M.D., etc.).  Second, although the discourse 
used in education policy conflates the two types of expectations, it tends to focus more 
attention on teachers’ expectations of future educational attainment, in part because of 
the emergence of the “college for all” culture that developed near the end of the 
twentieth century. 
 Next, I test the implications of the heuristic model using nationally 
representative data.  In order to fully understand the association between math teacher 
expectations and student achievement, I first identify the predictors of teacher 
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expectations.  In these models, I identify how much student, teacher, and school 
characteristics influence teacher expectations.  Net of the predictors, I then estimate 
the effect of math teacher expectations on student achievement and enrollment status.  
Before I present the results, I introduce the variables used for the analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3.1 presents the means and standard deviations for the primary variables 
of interest, all of which were drawn from the ELS.  The primary explanatory variable, 
math teacher expectations, and the key predictor variables were all drawn from the 
2002 base-year wave, at which point the students were enrolled in the tenth grade.  
The outcome variables—i.e., math test scores and 2004 enrollment status variables—
were drawn from the 2004 and 2006 follow-up waves, but also include tenth grade 
math test scores which was drawn from the 2002 base-year wave.  [See Chapter 2 and 
Appendix A for a more detailed description of the data.]  
The student characteristics include race, gender, the five measures of 
socioeconomic status (i.e., mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s 
occupational prestige score, father’s occupational prestige score, and family income), 
family structure, academic track, and four variables that capture students’ academic 
past (i.e., learning disability, ever enrolled in remedial math, ever held back, and ever 
had a behavior problem).  In addition to these student characteristics, I use ninth grade 
GPA as an indicator of past academic performance.  The teacher characteristics were 
drawn from the math teacher questionnaire and include teacher’s race, gender, age, a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether teachers have their teaching certification, and 
the number of years of teaching experience.  The school-level variables are all the 
common characteristics normally used in similar studies and include urbanicity, 














Table 3.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Primary Variables of Interest 
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 Mean S.D 
Achievement Test Scores   
IRT estimated number right (10th grade)  41.96 14.14 
IRT estimated number right (12th grade) 46.67 15.41 
Gain Score (12th – 10th grade IRT estimated number right) 4.49 6.40 
Enrollment Status in 2004   
Dropout .05  
Retained  .02  
Graduated on time .93  
Math Teacher Expectations (in years) 14.75 2.10 
Female .50  
Race (White is the reference category)   
Black .15  
Hispanic .16  
Asian .04  
Native American .01  
Multiracial .04  
Family Background   
Mother’s education (in years) 13.45 2.33 
Father’s education (in years) 13.59 2.59 
SEI score of mother’s occupation in 2002 (GSS 1989 coding) 44.98 12.88 
SEI score of father’s occupation in 2002 (GSS 1989 coding) 44.14 11.68 
Family income (natural log) 10.60 1.13 
Two-parent family .75  
Academic Past (as reported by parent)   
Learning disability .13  
Ever in remedial math .10  
Ever held back  .14  
Ever have behavior problem .09  
Academic Track (Academic is the reference category)   
General .40  
Vocational .12  
Math Teacher Characteristics   
Female .55  
Black .06  
Hispanic .05  
Asian .03  
Native American .01  
Multiracial .02  
Age (in years) 42.60 11.16 
Certified degree or higher .53  
Teaching experience (in years) 14.62 10.49 
Urbanicity (Suburban is the reference category)   
Urban .28  
Rural .21  
Region (Midwest is the reference category)   
Northeast .18  
South .35  






 Mean S.D 
School Characteristics   
School enrollment 1477.51 843.76 
Full-time teachers 83.32 42.89 
Percent minority 35.85 30.65 
Percent free-lunch 23.16 18.88 
Percent college prep 55.24 29.39 
Percent general track 51.27 34.40 
Percent vocational track 18.16 20.48 
Percent remedial math 6.94 9.24 
9th Grade GPA 2.66 .82 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002, 2004, and 2006 waves)   
Notes: The data are weighted by the NCES post-stratification weight (BYSTUWT) multiplied by the 
inverse probability of having non-missing information for the primary explanatory variable, math 
teacher expectations.  The twelfth grade math test score and math gain score models are weighted by 
the base-year adjustment weight multiplied by the inverse probability of being enrolled in the twelfth 
grade and being in the same school at the time of the 2004 wave.  The enrollment status variables are 
restricted to base-year wave respondents whose 2004 status was known.  For these variables, the data 
are weighted by the base-year adjustment weight multiplied by the inverse probability of remaining in 
the sample.  For all predictor variables and tenth grade math test score, N = 8,945 students enrolled in 
561 schools.  N = 6,776 students enrolled in 555 schools for the twelfth grade and math gain score 
models, and N = 8,611 students enrolled in 561 schools for the enrollment status variables.   
 
percent minority students, free-lunch recipients, students enrolled in remedial math, 
college prep, general track, and vocational track students.   
 
The Predictors of Teacher Expectations 
In a simple world, teachers would base their expectations of students on 
academic performance only.  We know from the extant research that this is not the 
case.  Table 3.2 presents five models that predict math teacher expectations.  Models 1 
to 3 identify the student, teacher, and school characteristics determinants of math 
teacher expectations.  Model 1 includes student characteristics only, whereas Model 2 
adds teacher characteristics and Model 3 adds school characteristics.  Models 3b and 
4, which I discuss later, are included as supplementary models that test the robustness 
of the findings from Models 1 to 3.  All non-dichotomous variables are centered 
around their means, so that the constants may be interpreted as the average years of 
schooling teachers expect students to complete. 
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The Model 1 coefficients suggest that teachers’ assessments of students are 
sensitive to student characteristics.  Take, for example, student race and gender, 
neither of which is an indicator of actual student ability.  Girls are expected to 
complete an estimated .22 years of schooling more than boys, which is not surprising 
given that girls tend to be more compliant in the academic setting.  In comparison, 
student race is a stronger predictor of teacher expectations.  Teachers expect black and 
Hispanic students to complete an estimated .55 and .24 years of schooling less than 
white students, respectively.  Asian students, by contrast, are expected to complete .74 
years more than white students.  Although the sizes of the coefficients for race and 
gender are quite small, they suggest that social stereotypes may influence teachers’ 
assessments of students (Correll and Ridgeway 2003).  The estimated coefficients also 
suggest that students from stable, affluent families are held to higher standards while 
students who are disadvantaged in some way are held to significantly lower standards.  
Together, the Model 1 coefficients imply that teachers’ predictions of future 
educational attainment are sensitive to students’ background.   
Model 2 suggests that teacher characteristics are weak predictors of teacher 
expectations, net of the student characteristics.  Black and Hispanic teachers have 
slightly higher average expectations, at .50 and .55, respectively, than white teachers.  
Moreover, adjusting for teacher race mediates student race, thus offering support for 
previous research indicating that teacher race matters (Downey and Pribesh 2004; 
Ehrenberg et al. 1985).  Teachers who are certified have slightly higher expectations 
of students, suggesting that the more training teachers have the better equipped they 
are to adjust to students’ needs and are therefore slightly more optimistic.  Despite the 
fact that they are weak predictors of teacher expectations, teacher characteristics 
should not be ignored, as is evidenced by the slight shift in the sizes of the coefficients 
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9th Grade GPA     1.19 
(.03) 
      
Constant 15.40 15.20 15.35 15.29 15.09 
R2 .28 .29 .30 .38 .45 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: The data are weighted by the NCES post-stratification weight (BYSTUWT) multiplied by the 
inverse probability of having non-missing information for the primary explanatory variable, math 
teacher expectations.  N = 8,945 students enrolled in 561 schools.  
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Teachers’ sensitivity to student race becomes even more apparent when the 
social context variables are added to the model (see Model 3).  The results presented 
in Model 3 also suggest that school characteristics do influence teacher expectations, 
insofar as the context in which teachers and students interact provides teachers with 
information about student ability and performance.  However, the small coefficients 
make it difficult to discern how much context really matters.  To test the robustness of 
the findings of Model 3, Model 3b adjusts for school fixed-effects.  School fixed-
effects models include a dummy for all schools but one, thereby adjusting for all 
between-school variability.  The remaining coefficients may therefore be interpreted 
as the average within-school relationships between the predictor variables and teacher 
expectations.  Adjusting for school fixed-effects has very little impact on the student 
and coefficients for teacher characteristics, thus suggesting that the context in which 
teachers interact with students does in fact matter.   
The models discussed so far offer evidence that student characteristics are the 
primary source of information on which teachers base their expectations.  In the 
academic setting, it is not uncommon for teachers to discuss students with other 
teachers.  Teachers use this information to construct initial expectations, which then 
influence how they perceive students.  Even though teachers update their expectations 
of students over time, knowledge of prior academic performance prepares them for 
what to expect, and in some sense sets a baseline expectation prior to any direct 
information the teacher observes about a student.  
Research in the Wisconsin model tradition typically adjusts for prior academic 
performance, a strategy I follow in Model 4.  The ELS data do not offer test scores 
prior to the tenth grade, but they do offer retrospective reports of student grades.  
Model 4 adds ninth grade GPA as a measure of prior academic performance to the 
Model 3 adjustment variables.  Compared to Model 3, including past performance 
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decreases the coefficients for student characteristics: the coefficient for gender is 
explained away entirely, and the coefficients for race, the four measures of academic 
past, and academic track are all reduced substantially.  The positive residual 
associations support the argument that teacher expectations are influenced by more 
than just student achievement 
So far, the results show that student, teacher and school characteristics are 
important predictors of teacher expectations.  The extent to which each set of predictor 
variables explains teacher expectations, however, is unknown because variance-
explained is a complex indicator of relative importance (as indicated in the many 
critiques of the Coleman Report; Coleman et al. 1966).  The amount of variance that 
each set of predictor variables explains is a function of assumptions about causal order 
and model specification (e.g., student, teacher, and school characteristics separately or 
in unison) as well as measurement error.  
One way to hone in on causal order is to estimate the upper and lower bound 
estimates of variance explained by each set of characteristics.  The upper bound 
estimate is the proportion of the variance explained by the most simple model in 
which coefficients for only one set of characteristics are estimated.  For example, the 
upper bound estimate of the variance explained by the student characteristics is 
estimated from the following model:  
 
€ 




TEi represents teacher expectations for individual i, 
€ 
β0 is the constant, and 
€ 
STUi  is a vector for student characteristics.  The lower bound estimate, or the unique 
contribution to the variance explained, is the difference between variance explained by 




TEi = β0 + β1STUi + β2TCHi + β3SCH j + e ,   (3.2) 
 
and the variance explained without the variables of interest: 
 
€ 




TCHi is a vector for teacher characteristics for student i and 
€ 
SCH j  is a vector 
for school characteristics in school j.  The upper and lower bound estimates give the 
range of the amount of the variance explained by each set of predictor variables.   
The top panel of Table 3.3 presents bounds for the amount of variance 
explained by the student, teacher, and school characteristics.  The lower and upper 
bounds indicate that student characteristics have the greatest influence on teacher 
expectations, explaining 24 to 28 percent of the variance.  School characteristics 
explain an additional one to six percent of the variance, and teacher characteristics 
explain about one percent.  Collectively, these estimates offer support for past 
research, which claims that teacher expectations are primarily a function of student 
characteristics, but that other factors also influence how teachers perceive students. 
Now consider the bottom panel, which presents the amount of variance 
explained by each set of predictor variables when prior academic performance is 
included as a predictor of teacher expectations (i.e., Model 4 in Table 3.2).  Recall that  
including prior academic performance reduced the associations between the student 
characteristics and teacher expectations.  Adjusting Equations (3.2) and (3.3) to 
include prior academic performance pushes the lower bound estimate down for student 
characteristics from 24 to six percent of the variance.  Meanwhile, prior academic 
performance explains between 15 and 34 percent of the variance.  It is still unclear  
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Tale 3.3: Upper and Lower Bound Estimates of the Percent Variance-Explained by 
Student, Teacher, and School Characteristics as well as Past Academic Performance 
 
A.  Model 3 Specification 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Student Characteristics .24 .28 
Teacher Characteristics .01 .01 
School Characteristics .01 .06 
   
 
B.  Model 4 Specification 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Student Characteristics .06 .28 
Teacher Characteristics .01 .01 
School Characteristics .02 .06 
9th Grade GPA .15 .34 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 3.2 notes.   
 
how to interpret this because, chronologically, academic performance follows the 
student predictors.  Still, the lower and upper bound estimates indicate that teacher 
expectations are primarily a function of student characteristics and prior academic 
performance. 
In sum, student characteristics and past academic performance are the strongest 
predictors of teacher expectations, which is to be expected.  The fact that student 
characteristics explain about one-quarter of the variance suggests that teachers 
strongly consider a student’s social background in estimating his or her future 
educational attainment.  They also offer evidence that teacher characteristics mediate 
teacher expectations, albeit modestly, which implies that teachers’ assessments of 
students are a function of teachers’ own characteristics and years of teaching 
experience.  Furthermore, Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.2 show that school characteristics 
also affect math teacher expectations because they shape the social environment in 
which teachers observe and interact with students.  Next, I examine how much teacher 
expectations matter for student achievement, net of these predictors.   
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Teacher Expectations and Student Achievement 
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the relationship between math 
teacher expectations and student test scores and enrollment status in 2004, net of the 
predictor variables identified in the previous section.  Table 3.4 presents the 
coefficients for math teacher expectations from regression models predicting tenth 
grade math test scores, twelfth grade math test scores, and math test score gains (i.e., 
12th – 10th grade).  [The full models are available in Tables B1, B2, and B3 in 
Appendix B.]  Each panel presents coefficients from six regression models predicting 
math test scores.  The first column presents the bivariate association between teacher 
expectations and Models 1 to 4 include the same adjustment variables as Models 1 to 4 
in Table 3.2.  It should be noted that math teachers did not know how students 
performed on the tenth grade math test at the time they completed the teacher 
questionnaire.  Therefore, the findings can be interpreted as the association of 
teachers’ expectations on student performance.   
The coefficients presented in the top panel suggest that math teacher 
expectations are positively associated with tenth grade math test scores.  The 
Unadjusted Model indicates that each additional year of school that teachers expect 
students to complete is associated with an increase of 3.98 points on the tenth grade 
math test.  The association decreases substantially to 2.77 when adjusting for student 
characteristics (see Model 1), and remains at this level in models that further adjust for 
teacher and school characteristics, respectively (see Models 2 and 3).  The Model 3b 
coefficient offers evidence that, net of student, teacher, and school characteristics, 
each additional year of schooling that teachers expect students to complete is 
associated with a 2.87-point gain in tenth grade math test scores.  Further adjusting for 
prior academic performance reduces the association by 25 percent, from 2.83 to 2.12 
(see Model 4).  The adjusted effect of teacher expectations is quite large.   For  
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Table 3.4: Math Teacher Expectations Coefficients from Regression Models 
Predicting 10th and 12th Grade Math Test Scores and Math Test Gains 
 Outcome Variable: 
10th Grade Math Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3b Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.98 2.77 2.82 2.83 2.87 2.12 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.08) 
       
 Outcome Variable: 
12th Grade Math Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3b Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 4.69 3.28 3.35 3.34 3.42 2.52 
 (.12) (.12) (.11) (.11) (.10) (.12) 
       
 Outcome Variable:  
Math Gain (12th – 10th Grade Math Test) 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3b Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations .58 .49 .49 .48 .49 .32 
 (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.07) 
       
       
Student Characteristics       
Teacher Characteristics       
School Characteristics       
School Fixed-Effects       
9th Grade GPA       
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2004 waves)  
Notes: The tenth grade math test score models are weighted by the NCES post-stratification weight 
(BYSTUWT) multiplied by the inverse probability of having non-missing information for the primary 
explanatory variable, math teacher expectations.  The twelfth grade math test score and math gain score 
models are weighted by the base-year adjustment weight multiplied by the inverse probability of being 
enrolled in the twelfth grade and being in the same school as the base-year wave at the time of the 2004 
wave.  N = 8,945 students enrolled in 561 schools for the tenth grade math test score models, and N = 
6,776 students enrolled in 555 schools for the twelfth grade and math gain score models.   
 
example, consider a student whose math teacher expects him or her to graduate from 
high school only versus completing a Bachelor’s degree.  The student expected to 
graduate from college will score an estimated 8.48 points (i.e., 2.12 * 4 = 8.48) more 
on the tenth grade math test than a student who is expected finish with a high school 
diploma only, or .60 standard deviations (i.e., 8.48 / 14.14 = 60).      
The results discussed so far suggest that math teacher expectations are strongly 
associated with tenth grade math test scores.  How lasting or predictive of future 
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attainment are teacher expectations?  To answer these questions, I offer two additional 
analyses in which I model the association between math teacher expectations in the 
tenth grade and both twelfth grade math test scores and math test score gains. 
Consider the middle panel, which presents the coefficients for math teacher 
expectations from models predicting twelfth grade math test scores.  The sizes of the 
coefficients are slightly larger but follow a similar pattern as the coefficients 
predicting tenth grade math test scores.  For example, the bivariate association is 
slightly larger, at 4.69 versus 3.98, thus suggesting that math teacher expectations in 
the tenth grade are associated with achievement gains between the tenth and twelfth 
grades.  Adjusting for student, teacher, and school characteristics reduces the size of 
the coefficient from 4.69 to 3.28 in Model 1, and to 3.35 and 3.34 in Models 2 and 3, 
respectively.  Even after adjusting for prior academic performance, the association 
remains quite strong at 2.52.  The bottom panel, which presents the results associated 
with test score gains, further gives evidence that math teacher expectations are 
associated with achievement gains over time.   
Together, these findings offer convincing support for the claim that teacher 
expectations matter for student outcomes.  According to the Model 3 results presented 
in Table 3.4, net of student, teacher, and school characteristics, students whose math 
teachers expect them to graduate from college have tenth grade math test scores that 
are 11.32 points higher than their peers who are expected to finish with a high school 
diploma (i.e., 2.83 * 4 = 11.32), or .80 standard deviations (i.e., 11.32 / 14.14 = .80).  
By the twelfth grade, the same difference increase by another two points (i.e., .48 * 4 
= 1.92), or .30 standard deviations (i.e., 1.92 / 6.40 = .30).  Although small, the 
estimated differences between the tenth and twelfth grades suggest that students 
benefit from having teachers who hold them to higher standards.  Next I examine the 
relationship between teacher expectations and the likelihood of students graduating on 
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time, being retained (i.e., held back a grade), and dropping out of school between 2002 
and 2004.  
 
Teacher Expectations and Student Enrollment 
Table 3.5 presents the predicted changes in the probability of graduating on 
time, being held back a grade, and dropping out of school by the spring of 2004, 
separately for students expected to graduate from high school (and go no further in 
school) versus those expected to graduate with a Bachelor’s degree or higher.8  To 
calculate the changes in the probabilities, I first estimated the likelihood of each 
outcome.  Then, using the estimated models, I estimated the discrete changes in the 
probability of students expected to graduate (1) from high school by 2004 and (2) with 
a Bachelor’s degree or higher, holding all covariates at their means.  The estimated 
probabilities presented may thus be interpreted as the differences in the average 
probability of students graduating on time, being held back, or dropping out of school 
by spring 2004.  Each panel presents the discrete changes in the probability for five 
models: the Unadjusted Model includes only math teacher expectations; Model 1 
includes student characteristics; Model 2 includes teacher characteristics; Model 3 
includes school characteristics; and Model 4 adds prior academic performance. 
Consider first the differences in the probability of students graduating on time.  
The Unadjusted Model indicates that students whose teachers expect them to graduate 
from high school and not go to college have a .831 probability of graduating by 2004.  
In comparison, students expected to graduate from college or higher have a .979 
probability of graduating on time, for a difference of .148.  The difference between the 
two groups decreases substantially from .148 to .082 when adjusting for student  
                                                        
8 For each panel, students who graduated early were treated as being on track to graduate on time.  
Removing them from the analysis does not significantly affect the odds for either outcome. 
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Table 3.5: Predicted Changes in the Probability of Graduating on Time, Being Held 
Back, and Dropping Out of School by Spring 2004 for Students Expected to Graduate 
from High School Only Versus Students Expected to Graduate with at Least a 
Bachelor’s Degree 
 Outcome Variable:  









Unadjusted Model: Math teacher expectations .831 .979 + .148 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student characteristics .902 .984 + .082 
Model 2: Model 1 + teacher characteristics .976 .995 + .019 
Model 3: Model 2 + school characteristics .973 .995 + .022 
Model 4: Model 3 + 9th grade GPA .987 .997 + .010 
    
 Outcome Variable:  









Unadjusted Model: Math teacher expectations .041 .009 - .032 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student characteristics .026 .008 - .018 
Model 2: Model 1 + teacher characteristics .010 .003 - .007 
Model 3: Model 2 + school characteristics .011 .004 - .007 
Model 4: Model 3 + 9th grade GPA .007 .003 - .004 
    










Unadjusted Model: Math teacher expectations .127 .013 - .114 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student characteristics .067 .009 -. 058 
Model 2: Model 1 + teacher characteristics .015 .002 - .013 
Model 3: Model 2 + school characteristics .017 .003 - .014 
Model 4: Model 3 + 9th grade GPA  .007 .001 - .006 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2006 waves)  
Notes: The coefficients and standard errors for math teacher expectations are available in Table B4 of 
Appendix B.  The enrollment status variables are restricted to base-year wave respondents whose 2004 
status was known, and therefore the sample is reduced to 8,611 students enrolled in 561 schools.  For 
these variables, the data are weighted by the base-year adjustment weight multiplied by the inverse 
probability of remaining in the sample. 
 
characteristics (see Model 1), to .022 when adjusting for teacher and school 
characteristics (see Model 3), and to .010 when adding prior academic performance 
(see Model 4).   
 47 
The middle panel presents the predicted changes in the probability of students 
being held back a grade (i.e., out of grade 12 in the spring of 2004).  The differences 
in the predicted probabilities suggest that teacher expectations have less influence on 
the likelihood of students being retained a grade.  For example, the difference between 
the Unadjusted Model estimates indicates that students expected to graduate from high 
school only are .032 times more likely to be held back a grade than their expected 
college-graduate peers.  However, this association is explained away almost entirely 
when the student, teacher, and school predictor variables and prior academic 
performance are included in the model (see Models 1, 2, 3, and 4), which shows that 
teacher expectations have less influence on student retention rates.  
The bottom panel of Table 3.5, by contrast, suggests that teacher expectations 
have slightly more impact on the likelihood of students dropping out of school.  The 
predicted probability of dropping out of school for students expected to graduate from 
high school only and go no further is .127, compared to .013 for students expected to  
at least complete college.  Again, the difference in the discrete changes in the 
probability of the two outcomes decreases substantially from .114 (see Unadjusted 
Model) to .058 when adjusting for student characteristics (see Model 1), to .014 when 
adjusting for teacher and school characteristics (see Model 3), and to .006 when 
adjusting for past academic performance (see Model 4).    
Together, the three panels presented in Table 3.5 offer additional evidence in 
support of the importance of teachers’ influence on students.  Although taking into 
account the predictor variables substantially reduces the difference in the predicted 
probabilities, the fact that the difference is not reduced entirely suggests that teacher 
expectations do predict on-time graduation and dropout, although not retention.  For 
struggling students, merely having a teacher who has high expectations may mean the 
difference between graduating and falling behind. 
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DISCUSSION 
Scholarship in sociology and educational psychology identifies teachers as 
integral actors in the learning process, but the magnitude of their influence has 
remained a source of debate (Jussim and Harber 2005; Ferguson 1998, 2003).  In this 
chapter, I examined the relationship between math teacher expectations and student 
achievement.  I first identified the predictors of teacher expectations, and then 
modeled the relationship between math teacher expectations and student achievement.  
The results for the first analysis suggest that a wide range of characteristics predict 
teacher expectations, but that teacher expectations are primarily a function of student 
characteristics.  The results from the second analysis show that math teacher 
expectations strongly predict student achievement, whether achievement is a measure 
of math test scores or the likelihood of students staying on track and graduating on 
time.  This finding holds true even after the common causes of math teacher 
expectations are taken into account.  Moreover, in these two analyses, I do not attempt 
to make any claims about the causal order of the predictor variables.  Rather, I 
estimate the extent to which the predictors identified in decades of research on teacher 
expectations explain math teacher expectations.  Although the magnitude of the effect 
varies across outcomes, the results suggest that teacher expectations are strong 
predictors of student achievement. 
Current education policy calls upon teachers to raise student achievement by 
holding all students accountable to meet a uniform standard.  The argument maintains 
that teachers who hold socially stigmatized groups to lower standards are responsible 
for the size of achievement gaps.  Therefore, pressuring teachers to raise their 
expectations will raise student achievement for these groups, and in turn narrow the 
achievement gaps.  In the next chapter, I examine how teachers respond to state-level 
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pressure to raise their expectations, and whether accountability interventions do, in 




TEACHER EXPECTATIONS AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN THE ERA OF 
SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
This chapter examines how teachers respond to state-level pressure to raise 
their expectations for students.  In the remainder of this chapter, I briefly discuss the 
history of the testing movement, followed by a review of findings from the literature 
on accountability systems.  I then present a heuristic model of student achievement 
that incorporates accountability interventions into the model presented in Chapter 3.  
Using the Education Longitudinal Study data matched to the state-level accountability 
dataset that I constructed, I address three research questions: (1) How do teachers 
respond to accountability interventions? (2) Do teachers communicate these 
expectations to students? and (3) What are the consequences for student learning for 
low- and high-performing students?  Finally, I discuss the results in the context of 
current education policy.  
  
REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Tests have been used since as early as the 1840s (Resnick 1982), but it was not 
until the middle of the twentieth century that they were used for purposes other than 
routine monitoring of student performance.  Since then, the testing movement has 
undergone several transitions, each of which was driven by a change in the primary 
motivation for testing.  In this section, I briefly describe the major waves of testing at 
the primary and secondary school levels, paying particular attention to how tests have 
shifted from being used as mere assessments of student performance to assessments 
with consequences (for extensive reviews, see Grodsky, Warren, and Felts 2008; 
Hamilton 2003; Koretz 2008a; Linn 2000, 2008). 
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The first major transition was sparked by James B. Conant (1953)’s argument 
that tests should be used to identify students eligible for higher education.  He 
maintained that using tests for admissions decisions would make the college 
application process more competitive by opening doors to students who would 
normally not consider pursuing a post-secondary education.  Colleges and universities 
responded accordingly, relying on norm-referenced tests (NRTs) for admission 
decisions.  NRTs assess student knowledge of basic skills and score students relative 
to the average for the reference populations.  This “norm-referencing” allows colleges 
and universities to gauge the quality of the students they accept relative to the national 
pool of college applicants.  Today, NRTs are still commonly used tests.  For example, 
NRTs are used to evaluate student performance throughout elementary and secondary 
school (e.g., ITBS/ITED, SAT-9, and CAT-7), and as entrance exams for college (e.g., 
SAT and ACT) and higher education programs (e.g., GRE, MCAT, and LSAT).  
Despite their widespread use, NRTs are generally considered a secondary alternative 
to criterion-referenced tests, because of the fit of the test to the content (see below).  
The second wave of testing was initiated by the enactment of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA).  Nearly a decade after the seminal 
Brown v. Board of Education ruling that declared “separate but equal” 
unconstitutional, the federal government responded to the lack of progress made by 
states in closing the achievement gaps between black and white students.  ESEA 
defined the federal government as the primary overseer of the highly decentralized 
public education system.  ESEA included many programs, each of which was targeted 
toward improving the expectations and quality of education for targeted groups.  One 
such program, Title 1, required that states administer minimum competency tests 
(MCTs) to low-income students (i.e., students who were more likely to be non-white 
and live in the South) to ensure that they could demonstrate knowledge of basic skills.  
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To educators, MCTs did not pose a problem as long as student performance was above 
the minimum threshold.  Policymakers, on the other hand, were concerned that they 
were too basic and therefore “let educators off the hook.”   
Whether or not MCTs were vigorous assessments of student performance, the 
severity of educational inequality became clear after 35 states used minimum 
competency tests by the end of the 1970s (Koretz 2008a).  For the first time educators 
and policymakers had evidence that allowed them to assess the quality of the public 
education system.  Moreover, state departments of education acknowledged that the 
lack of structure contributed to achievement gaps and used the opportunity to define 
clear content standards (i.e., “what” students should know) and performance standards 
(i.e., “how much” students should know).  Several states also attached sanctions to test 
scores, thus marking the beginning of the accountability movement.  
The third wave of testing was initiated by the publication of A Nation At Risk 
(National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983), a federally mandated review 
of the public education system.  The report assessed student performance at both the 
national and international levels and concluded that the American school system was 
failing.  Policymakers were appalled, and called for increased accountability.  The 
report was the first to make international comparisons, which only heightened the call 
made by policymakers and American observers for educators to monitor student 
achievement more closely.   
Throughout the 1980s, most states made a concerted effort to hold schools and 
students accountable for meeting defined achievement expectations.  The heightened 
sense of responsibility resulted in an increased reliance on test usage, thus legitimizing 
tests as a means of measuring student performance.  It also called for more rigorous 
tests that would provide the information necessary to assess overall student 
performance relative to defined content standards.  States responded by replacing 
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MCTs with criterion-referenced tests (CRTs).  Unlike MCTs, CRTs are aligned to 
state curricula and use proficiency-level cut-scores (e.g., “advanced,” “proficient,” and 
“basic”) rather than a single baseline for performance expectations.  During this wave, 
states expanded the population of students they tested to include all students, rather 
than only low-income students authorized to be tested under Title 1 of the ESEA.  As 
a result, educators and policymakers gained better knowledge of student performance 
relative to state standards.  However, because CRTs are state-specific, student 
performance in one state cannot be compared to performance in another state. 
By the late 1980s, several states took an additional step toward greater 
accountability by administering performance assessment tests (PATs), which are 
thought to be more challenging assessments of student knowledge than CRTs or 
NRTs.  PATs measure similar information as CRTs, but rather than using multiple 
choice or true/false questions, they require students to present their work (e.g., proofs 
or written essays), therein allowing teachers to follow how students answer questions 
and identify where their logic differs.  Despite the fact that PATs offer more detailed 
information about student performance, they are less common than NRTs and CRTs 
because they are difficult to grade and much more expensive to grade (Koretz 2008a).  
Today, all states rely on some form of testing, using a mixture of NRTs, CRTs, 
or PATs.  Although CRTs are, by far, the most commonly used test, many states 
administer additional tests as well.  Prior to NCLB, there was no defined national 
framework on which to structure accountability systems; therefore, states that 
administered more than one type of test benefitted from having different types of 
evidence of student performance.  Furthermore, because no one test is superior to 
others for all purposes, the more information that states gathered about students, the 
better equipped they were to make adjustments to their education systems.  All states 
tested students at both the elementary and secondary school levels, but elementary 
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students were tested more frequently.  In addition to determining which tests to use, 
states also determined which subjects they tested students.  English and math were the 
most frequently tested subjects, however, many states also tested student performance 
in science and/or social studies. 
NCLB introduced a school-based accountability system that increased 
achievement standards and the frequency of testing, but also attached sanctions to poor 
student performance.  Under NCLB, all states are required to adopt more rigorous 
content and achievement standards, and tests are used to determine whether students 
meet these performance expectations.  All states are required to test students annually 
in math and reading in grades 3 through 8 and at least once in high school.  Since 
NCLB was enacted, both science and social studies tests have been added to the 
testing regime.  Test scores are used to set annual achievement targets for the “annual 
yearly progress” report, which is used to help all students reach the NCLB target 
whereby all students are “proficient” by 2014.  Thus, NCLB built upon the lessons 
learned from the previous 30 years of testing.  In the next section, I review the 
research on accountability systems.  I also discuss the complications associated with 
examining the impact of testing on teachers’ responses to state-level pressure to raise 
their expectations of students, and subsequently on student achievement. 
 
Assessing the Impact of Testing on Student Achievement 
The fundamental goal of accountability interventions is to motivate teachers to 
teach and students to learn.  Tests purportedly assess whether this goal is met.  Despite 
the fact that accountability tests have been used since the 1970s, it is unclear if they 
produce the intended outcomes.  The lack of consensus of their effects is in part due to 
the lack of available data that allows scholars to study the heterogeneity of 
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accountability systems, and in part to the variety of techniques used to model 
accountability systems (Linn 2008), some of which generate different estimates.   
To date, research primarily focuses on the direct impact of accountability 
systems on student achievement.  Some research suggests that accountability 
expectations may increase test scores, but that their effect tends to differ by students’ 
race and socioeconomic status (Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Hanushek and Raymond 2005; 
Roderick, Jacob, and Bryk 2002).  Some researchers claim that merely introducing 
accountability interventions increases student test scores (Grissmer and Flanagan 
1998; Ladd 1999; Texas Agency 2000), grades (Roderick et al. 2002), and work effort 
(Roderick and Engel 2001).  Even if test scores increase when accountability systems 
are first introduced, the association between accountability expectations and test 
scores tends to weaken over time (Linn, Graue, and Sanders 1990).   
More recently, Fuller, Wright, Gesicki, and Kang (2007) show that overall test 
score growth has on average decreased since NCLB was passed, they also show, 
however, that states have different rates of test score growth, which they argue is a 
function of different achievement standards before and after NCLB was enacted.  
Specifically, many states already had high performance standards (e.g., 70th percentile) 
before NCLB was enacted (Linn 2003).  The only difference is that, before NCLB, 
states were not required to attach sanctions to performance standards.  As a result, 
states that had initially high achievement standards prior to NCLB made fewer 
achievement gains because their achievement standards were already high.  By 
contrast, states that had low achievement standards prior to NCLB showed greater 
achievement gains because they were forced to raise their achievement expectations 
and also because there were real-life consequences attached to poor performance 
(Fuller et al. 2007).  It is also possible that achievement gains are a function of states 
simultaneously increasing graduation requirements (Schiller and Muller 2003).  In 
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other words, accountability interventions may be associated with test scores, but they 
appear to be most effective when they are first introduced or accompanied by a 
revision of achievement expectations. 
Within the literature on accountability systems, scholars have also examined 
how sanctions attached to test scores affect student outcomes.  Some claim that 
sanctions such as exit exams are associated with higher achievement gains (Winfield 
1990) while others find no evidence of an association (Grodsky, Warren, and 
Kalogrides 2009).  However, Jacob (2001) cautions that any association between 
sanctions and achievement can be explained by adjusting for student characteristics.  
Adjusting for school context, Carnoy and Loeb (2002) find that student achievement 
gains are greatest in states with stronger accountability systems, but the type of 
accountability (i.e., report card or sanctions) is not associated with significantly 
different achievement gains (Hanushek and Raymond 2004).  
Further complicating matters, it is unclear whether achievement gains are a 
result of low-performing students having been sorted into special education or retained 
the year prior to an important assessment (Amrein-Beardsley and Berliner 2003; Figlio 
and Getzler 2006; Jacob 2005; see also Hanushek and Raymond 2003).  Some 
researchers find evidence that low-performing schools protect themselves from falling 
below state standards by sorting low-performing students into alternative tracks where 
they are exempt from accountability expectations (Darling-Hammond 1991; Haney 
2000).  Schools that use such a strategy may do more harm to students than intended, 
because the learning standards are lower for students enrolled in special education.  
Similarly, students who are retained the year prior to an important assessment do not 
necessarily benefit from the additional year of preparation (Roderick, Nagaoka, and 
Allensworth 2005), and are also more likely drop out of school (Hauser 2004). 
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Research examining the association between accountability interventions and 
dropout or retention rates is also unclear.  Some evidence suggests that accountability 
testing decreases the likelihood of high school graduation, especially among 
traditionally disadvantaged groups (Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Darling-Hammond 2003; 
Warren, Jenkins, and Kulick 2006).  Evidence on whether sanctions (e.g., high school 
exit exam requirements) increase or decrease dropout rates is also unclear (Jacob 
2001; Ladd 1999; Lillard and DiCicca 2001).   
After 40 years of research, it thus is still unclear whether accountability 
interventions produce the intended outcomes.  One of the biggest shortcomings of the 
research on accountability systems is the lack of rich data to examine such questions.  
Much of the extant research focuses on single case studies, such as Chicago (e.g., 
Jacob 2001; Roderick and Engel 2002; Roderick et al. 2002; Roderick et al. 2005), 
Texas (e.g., Deere and Strayer 2003; Haney 2000; Ladd 1999; Texas Education 
Agency 2000), or Kentucky (e.g., Koretz and Barron 1998).  These analyses offer rich 
information about each case, but insofar as they are predictive, the results cannot be 
extrapolated easily to other cities or states.  Some studies match accountability 
characteristic data to nationally representative data (e.g., the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress, also known as “NAEP”) and estimate the achievement gains 
associated with accountability interventions  (e.g., Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Grodsky et 
al. 2009; Hanushek and Raymond 2004).  However, as Olson (2005) shows, the 
NAEP achievement standards tend to be higher than state standards, and as a result, 
studies that use these data tend to report lower rates of proficiency.   Evidence also 
demonstrates that accountability test scores do not necessarily generalize to scores on 
other tests, such college entrance exams (Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, and Stetcher 
2000; Koretz and Barron 1998), therein bringing into question the validity of what 
accountability tests measure.  Scholars are still learning how to address the 
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methodological complications association with such complex research questions and 
how to model state accountability characteristics (see Koretz 2008b for a discussion).  
In addition to these concerns, Raudenbush (2004) argues that studies often fail to 
discount competing hypotheses because they do not take into account prior academic 
performance and school context differences.  
So far I have discussed findings from research that examines how students 
respond to accountability expectations, suggesting that accountability interventions 
may or may not raise student achievement.  The research discussed thus far focus on 
the direct association between accountability interventions and student outcomes.  
Teachers, as mediators in the learning process, are overlooked, primarily because the 
data used do not include information about teachers.  What research does exist tends to 
focus on teachers’ responses to accountability interventions only.  As a result, it is 
unclear whether the association between accountability interventions and student 
performance is a result of increased student awareness of accountability expectations, 
teachers responding to state-level pressure and more effectively communicating 
achievement expectations to students, or both.  Next, I discuss what is known about 
how teachers respond to accountability interventions. 
 
Teachers’ Responses to Accountability Interventions 
Teachers often oppose the use of accountability tests as a means of measuring 
student achievement because state-level standards interfere with their teaching 
agendas.  Although tests are intended for use as direct measures of student 
achievement, they are also possible indicators of teacher effectiveness, and therefore 
may be threatening to teachers.  The more pressure teachers feel to meet expectations, 
the more likely they are to adjust their teaching plans in order to prepare students for 
the tests, modifying their teaching strategies and content matter to spend more time on 
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material they know will be on the tests (Abrams et al. 2003; Linn 1994; Taylor et al. 
2003; see McDonnell 2004 for a review).  For example, in their analysis of Colorado 
teachers, Taylor and colleagues (2003) found that teachers were quite responsive to 
changes in state-defined achievement expectations, especially when the subject matter 
was to be tested.  Teachers aligned lesson plans according to the new content 
standards, which improved the overall level of instruction, but also admitted to setting 
aside instruction time in order to prepare students for the test.  This affected the 
quality of students’ education insofar as the more time teachers spent preparing 
students for subjects tested (e.g., math and English, the less time they spent on 
subjects not tested (e.g., science and social studies).  Teachers may also respond by 
directing more attention to the students who are close to the cut point (Hamilton et al. 
2007), or by adjusting student test scores in order to meet achievement cut-off points 
(Dewan 2010; Jacob and Levitt 2002).  Overall, most teachers oppose the use of tests 
because tests introduce additional challenges to everyday teaching demands. 
 Even if teachers do not believe that tests are necessary to monitor student 
attainment, they are useful tools that, when used properly, help teachers identify 
students in need of additional help (Shields et al. 2004).  Furthermore, attaching 
sanctions to tests introduces an incentive for teachers and students to perform well.   
Students’ mastery of state-defined expectations is a matter of many factors, most of 
which rely on teachers making the necessary adjustments to instruction plans and 
communicating expectations to students such that they adopt them as their own.   
 
A MODEL OF TEACHER EXPECTATIONS AND STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT IN THE ERA OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY  
Although the fate of many of the control provisions of NCLB will be debated, 
accountability testing is likely to continue to be a prominent feature of education in the 
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United States.  Despite the fact that tests have been used for several decades, much is 
to be learned about how to measure expectations and how to model them accordingly, 
especially given that testing can be stressful for both students and teachers (Jones et al. 
1999; Steele 1997).  Furthermore, while the extant research offers some insight as to 
how students and teachers respond to state accountability standards, very little is 
known about how teachers mediate the effects of these accountability expectations.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: A Heuristic Model of the Observed Determinants of Teacher Expectations 
and Student Achievement, Adjusting for Accountability Interventions 
 
Recall Figure 3.2 from Chapter 3, which presented a heuristic model of the 
observed determinants of teacher expectations and student achievement.  In the model, 
teacher expectations affect student achievement directly as well as through a set of 
common causes (i.e., student, teacher, and school characteristics).  Now consider how 
accountability interventions affect the association between teacher expectations and 
student achievement.  The model presented in Figure 4.1 introduces two additional 
paths to the model presented in Figure 3.2: (1) from accountability interventions to 














performance.9  In the model both teacher expectations and accountability interventions 
affect student achievement directly.  The model also allows teacher expectations to 
affect student achievement indirectly by way of accountability interventions. 
In the next section, I introduce the state-level accountability data and discuss 
the ways in which state accountability interventions vary across states.  Then, using 
the model presented in Figure 4.1, I address the following questions: (1) How do 
teachers respond to accountability interventions? (2) Do teachers communicate these 
expectations to students? and (3) What are the consequences for student learning for 
low- and high-performing students?   
 
RESULTS 
Characteristics of State Accountability Systems 
Table 4.1 presents the 2001-02 accountability system characteristics for grades 
9 to 12 for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia (see Chapter 2 for a 
detailed description of the data and variable construction).  The table highlights the 
complexity of state accountability systems.  The first column identifies states that were 
early participants in the movement to use tests as a means of monitoring student 
performance.  Compared to the early 1970s, when only a few states used standardized 
tests to monitor student performance, 36 states used tests by 1991.  By the 2001-02 
academic school year, all 50 states and the District of Columbia administered 
standardized tests to students, either to monitor student progress or as accountability 
measures.  The next three columns identify the type of tests that states used, followed 
by whether states had an exit exam requirement.  The final four columns present the 
number of times that states administered math, English, science, and social studies  
                                                        





































  Type of Test  Testing Frequency in High School  
 Early 
Adopter PAT NRT CRT 
Exit 





Alabama    1 1 1 1   -.77 
Alaska 1  1 1 1 2 2   -.21 
Arizona   1 1  2 2   -.21 
Arkansas   1 1 1 2 2  1 .04 
California 1  1 1 1 3 3 3 3 1.81 
Colorado 1  1 1  3 3 1  .60 
Connecticut 1 1  1  1 1 1  -.52 
Delaware 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 -.28 
DC   1   3 3   .36 
Florida  1 1 1 1 2 2 1  .04 
Georgia 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 -.28 
Hawaii 1  1 1  1 1   -.77 
Idaho 1  1 1  3 3 2 2 1.33 
Illinois 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 -.28 
Indiana 1  1 1 1 1 1   -.77 
Iowa 1  1   1 1 1  -.52 
Kansas    1  1 1   -.77 
Kentucky   1 1  2 4 1 1 .86 
Louisiana 1  1 1 1 2 2 2 2 .76 
Maine 1 1  1  1 1 1 1 -.28 
Maryland 1   1 1 2 2 1 1 .28 
Massachusetts 1   1 1 1 1   -.77 
Michigan    1  1 1 1 1 -.28 
Minnesota 1 1  1 1  1   -1.04 
Mississippi 1   1 1 3 3 3 3 1.81 
Missouri 1 1 1 1  1 1 2 1 -.04 
Montana   1   1 1 1 1 -.28 
Nebraska  1 1 1  1 1   -77 
Nevada 1   1 1 2 2   -.21 
New 
Hampshire 
   1  1 1 1 1 -.28 
New Jersey 1   1 1 1 1   -.77 
New Mexico 1   1 1 2 2 2 2 .76 
New York 1   1 1 2 1  2 -.01 
North 
Carolina 
1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 2.86 
North Dakota   1   1 1   -.77 
Ohio 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 -.28 
Oklahoma 1   1   1  1 -.80 
Oregon 1 1  1  1 1 1  -.52 
Pennsylvania 1 1  1  1 2   -.48 
Rhode Island 1   1  1 2 1  -.23 
South 
Carolina 
1   1 1 1 1   -.77 
South Dakota   1   1 2 1 1 .01 
Tennessee 1 1  1 1 1 2 1  -.23 
Texas 1   1 1 2 2 1 1 .28 





  Type of Test  Testing Frequency in High School  
 Early 
Adopter PAT NRT CRT 
Exit 





Vermont 1 1  1  1 1 1  -.52 
Virginia 1  1 1 1 4 2 3 4 2.03 
Washington   1 1  2 2   -.21 
West Virginia 1  1   3 3 3  1.09 
Wisconsin 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 -.2 
Wyoming   1 1  1 1   -.77 
Source: State-Level Accountability Characteristics 
Notes: See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the sources of information and variable construction.  
 
tests to students between grades 9 and 12, and the last column presents an index of the 
frequency of testing.  One component of the index is the subjects that were tested (i.e., 
math, English, science, and social studies).  All states except Minnesota and 
Oklahoma tested students in math and English during the 2001-02 academic school 
year.  Few states, by contrast, tested science and social studies.  A second component 
of the index is testing frequency, which differs by subjects as well as from state to 
state. 
Table 4.2 presents the state-level and student-level means and standard 
deviations for variables presented in Table 4.1 as they are matched to the ELS data.  
Looking at the state-level means, nearly three out of four states (or 72 percent) were 
early participants in the testing movement.  CRTs are by far the most common type of 
test used (90 percent), and PATs are the least common type of test administered (22 
percent), which is not surprising given that they are so costly to grade.  Fifty-two 
percent of states use NRTs.  Only 44 percent of states required students to pass an exit 
exam to graduate.  On average, states administered between one and two tests in both 
English and math tests, and only about one test of science and social studies.  
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Table 4.2: State-Level and Student-Level Means and Standard Deviations for the 
Characteristics of 2001-02 State Accountability Systems 
 State-Level  Student-Level 
 Mean S.D  Mean S.D. 
Early Implementer .72    .79  
PAT .22   .23  
NRT .52   .48  
CRT .90   .97  
Exit Exam .44   .64  
Frequency of Testing Index -.00 .84  .17 .97 
Frequency of Math Testing 1.60 .93  1.73 .97 
Frequency of English Testing 1.70 .86  1.75 .88 
Frequency of Science Testing .96 1.03  1.12 1.14 
Frequency of Social Studies Testing .76 1.04  1.09 1.21 
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave) 
Notes: The state-level means and standard deviations (N = 50) are not weighted.  The student-level 
means (N = 8,945 students enrolled in 561 schools) and standard deviations are weighted by the NCES 
post-stratification weight (BYSTUWT) multiplied by the inverse probability of having non-missing 
information for the primary explanatory variable, math teacher expectations. 
 
Do Accountability Interventions Influence Teacher Expectations? 
Recall Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, which identified the student, teacher, and school 
level determinants of teacher expectations.  The findings demonstrate that although 
teacher expectations are primarily a function of student characteristics, the context of 
schooling also matters.  The current chapter extends this logic to argue that the social 
context of schools is, in part, a function of state-defined standards.  Accordingly, the 
following analysis examines how accountability interventions influence teacher 
expectations, adjusting for the student, teacher, and school determinants of teacher 
expectations identified in Table 3.2.   
 Table 4.3 shows the coefficients for accountability interventions from models 
that regress math teacher expectations on accountability interventions and the 
adjustment variables.  For the following analysis, each accountability characteristic is 
modeled separately.  The first column of each panel presents the bivariate association 
between each accountability intervention and math teacher expectations.  Model 1 
adjusts for student and teacher characteristics while Model 2 adjusts for school 
characteristics only.  Model 3 then adjusts for student, teacher, and school 
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characteristics, and Model 4 further adjusts for ninth grade GPA.  The models do not 
adjust for region (as this is superfluous when state characteristics are modeled). 
Consider the top panel, which examines whether math teacher expectations in states 
with a history of testing differ from those in states that only recently joined the 
accountability movement.  The bivariate association suggests that math teacher 
expectations are slightly higher in states that were early adopters of accountability 
systems.  The association, which is already quite weak, decreases from .16 to .11 when 
adjusting for student and teacher characteristics (see Model 1), and is explained away 
entirely when adjusting for school characteristics only (see Model 2).  When ninth 
Grade GPA is included in the model (see Model 4), the size of the coefficient and 
standard error suggest that early implementation has no influence on teacher 
expectations.  
The next three panels examine the association between the type of test 
administered and math teacher expectations.  Recall that each test offers a unique 
assessment of student knowledge.  PATs offer rigorous assessments of student ability, 
but are costly.  NRTs assess more basic knowledge and provide scores that are scaled 
to the reference population.  CRTs, the most common type of test, assess student 
knowledge of state-defined curricula, and therefore offer insight into student 
performance relative to defined achievement expectations.  
The three panels in Table 4.3 suggest that there is no systematic pattern of 
association between the type of test used and math teacher expectations.  For example, 
the bivariate association suggests that teachers in states that administer PATs have, on 
average, slightly higher teacher expectations.  This weak association is explained away 
by adjusting for student and teacher characteristics (see Model 1) and school 
characteristics (see Model 2).  By contrast, the bivariate association for NRTs suggests 
that they are associated with slightly lower math teacher expectations.  The association  
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Table 4.3: Accountability Intervention Coefficients from Regression Models 
Predicting Math Teacher Expectations 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Early Implementer  .16 .11 -.00 .01 .15 
 (.09) (.06) (.08) (.06) (.06) 
      
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PAT .17 .01 .09 .04 .05 
 (.10) (.06) (.08) (.06) (06) 
      
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
NRT -.23 -.21 -.15 -.14 -.18 
 (.08) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06) 
      
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CRT -.03 -.04 -.26 -.17 -.01 
 (.20) (.13) (.18) (.12) (.13) 
      
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Exit Exam -.03 -.03 .04 -.03 .05 
 (.08) (.06) (.07) (.06) (06) 
      
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Testing Index  -.10 -.08 -.05 -.07 -.05 
 (.05) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) 
      
      
Student Characteristics      
Teacher Characteristics      
School Characteristicsa      
9th Grade GPA      
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: The data are weighted by the NCES post-stratification weight (BYSTUWT) multiplied by the 
inverse probability of having non-missing information for the primary explanatory variable, math 
teacher expectations.  N = 8,945 students enrolled in 561 schools. 
a Region is not included as an adjustment variable. 
 
decreases only slightly from .23 to .21 when adjusting for student and teacher 
characteristics (see Model 1) and to .15 when adjusting for school characteristics (see 
Model 2).  Not adjusting for anything, CRTs have no association with math teacher 
expectations.  Once school characteristics are taken into account, the coefficient 
 68 
increases from -.03 (see Unadjusted Model) to -.26 (see Model 2), and to -.17 when 
student and teacher characteristics are added (see Model 3).  However, the negative 
association is explained away entirely when 9th grade GPA is added to the model (see 
Model 4).  Together, these three panels suggest that teachers do not respond to the 
type of information gathered.  
In addition to using tests to monitor student performance, some states require 
that students pass an exit exam in order to graduate.  The fifth panel, which presents 
the coefficients for exit exams, suggests that exit exams also have no impact on 
teacher expectations.  The last panel examines whether testing frequency influences 
math teacher expectations.  In theory, accountability tests offer teachers additional 
information upon which to evaluate students, and hence one might anticipate an 
association with teacher expectations.  The coefficients for testing frequency 
demonstrate that this measure has no net impact on math teacher expectations.  
The findings presented in Table 4.3 do not provide evidence that supports 
policy claims that teachers raise their expectations to accountability standards.  If 
anything, they suggest that teachers lower their expectations of students.   
 
Accountability Interventions, Teacher Expectations, and Student Achievement 
Do accountability characteristics affect the student-teacher relationship?  To 
address this question, I present two pieces of analysis.  I first present findings from a 
model that allows both math teacher expectations and accountability interventions to 
predict student achievement directly.  I then present findings from a model that 
includes the interaction effect between math teacher expectations and accountability 
interventions.  Findings from this model reveal whether accountability interventions alter the association between math teacher expectations and tenth grade math test 
scores.   
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Table 4.4 shows results from models regressing tenth grade math test scores on 
each type of accountability intervention, math teacher expectations, and the 
adjustment variables.  The models correspond to those presented earlier in Table 4.3.  
Following the Unadjusted Model, Model 1 adjusts for student and teacher 
characteristics while Model 2 adjusts for school characteristics only.  Model 3 then 
includes the student, teacher, and school predictor variables, and Model 4 further 
adjusts for 9th grade GPA.  Similar to the analysis presented in Table 4.3, each 
characteristic of accountability testing is modeled separately.  Finally, the top panel, 
which does not include any of the accountability intervention variables, is presented 
for reference purposes only.   
Before discussing the association between accountability interventions and 
tenth grade math test scores, first consider how adding the accountability intervention 
variables to the models affects the direct effect of math teacher expectations on math 
test scores.  Compared to the results presented in the top panel, the sizes of the 
coefficients for math teacher expectations do not change when the accountability 
intervention variables are included in the models, thus demonstrating that math teacher 
expectations and the measures of accountability interventions are largely unrelated. 
Now consider the association between accountability interventions and tenth 
grade math test scores.  The second panel presents the results for the models that 
estimate the association between early adoption and tenth grade math test scores.  The 
coefficients suggest that math test scores are slightly higher in states that were early 
adopters.  For example, the Unadjusted Model indicates that math test scores are .38 
points higher in states that were early adopters.  This association remains at about this 















Table 4.4: Coefficients for Math Teacher Expectations and Accountability 















Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.98 2.82 3.71 2.82 2.14 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Early Implementer 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.97 2.82 3.71 2.82 2.13 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
Early Implementer .38 .42 .38 .24 .71 
 (.61) (.42) (.46) (.42) (.42) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Performance Assessment Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.97 2.82 3.71 2.82 2.14 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
PAT 1.24 .26 .03 .11 .20 
 (.56) (.44) (.44) (.42) (.40) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Norm-Referenced Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.98 2.82 3.71 2.82 2.13 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
NRT -.05 -.32 -.01 -.32 -.56 
 (.52) (.35) (.41) (.37) (.36) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Criterion-Referenced Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.98 2.82 3.71 2.82 2.14 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (08) (.09) 
CRT -.43 1.05 1.04 1.23 1.66 
 (1.68) (1.27) (1.37) (1.25) (.1.12) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Exit Exam 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.98 2.82 3.71 2.82 2.13 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (08) 
Exit Exam -.72 .86 .68 .94 1.19 






 Accountability Intervention:  
Testing Index 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.97 2.83 3.72 2.83 2.14 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
Testing Index -.26 .23 .40 .29 .31 
 (.26) (.20) (.21) (.19) (.19) 
      
      
Student Characteristics      
Teacher Characteristics      
School Characteristicsa      
9th Grade GPA      
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 4.3 notes. 
a Region is not included as an adjustment variable. 
 
Models 1, 2, and 3), but increases slightly to .71 when further adjusting for prior 
academic performance (see Model 4).  In other words, math test scores tend to be 
slightly higher in states that were early to implement an accountability system.  The 
next three panels present the results for PATs, NRTs, and CRTs, respectively.  The 
coefficients show that the associations differ by test type.  For example, the coefficient 
for the bivariate association for PATs is 1.24 (see Unadjusted Model).  This 
association is explained away almost entirely when the student, teacher, and school 
predictor variables and prior academic performance are included in the model (see 
Models 1, 2, 3, and 4).  NRTs, on the other hand, are associated with lower test scores, 
but only when student and teacher characteristics (see Models 1 and 3).  By contrast, 
the bivariate association for CRTs is -.43, suggesting that math test scores are on 
average slightly lower in states that use CRTs (see Unadjusted Model).  This 
association then becomes positive once the predictor variables are added to the model 
(see Models 1, 2, 3, and 4), which can be explained by the fact that states that use 
CRTs tend to have lower average socioeconomic status.  The coefficients for both exit 
exams and the testing index follow a similar pattern as CRTs, where the bivariate 
associations are slightly negative, but become positive once student, teacher, and 
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school characteristics are added to the model.  Similar to CRTs, both exit exams and 
testing frequency are also associated with slightly higher math test scores once the 
adjustment variables are included in the model.  
The results presented in Table 4.4 show that, except for NRTs, accountability 
interventions are associated with slightly higher math test scores.  They also show that 
models that fail to adjust for student characteristics may in fact mask the association 
between accountability interventions and math test scores (Raudenbush 2004).  The 
models presented in Table 4.4 assume that the association between math teacher 
expectations and math test scores does not differ according to compliance with 
accountability standards.  However, it is possible that teachers adjust their 
expectations to accountability tests, and, in turn, teachers may more accurately predict 
students’ future educational attainment.  Table 4.5 shows results from models that 
allow math teacher expectations to differ according to accountability testing 
requirements.  For this analysis, I regress tenth grade math test scores on each 
accountability intervention, math teacher expectations, the interaction between math 
teacher expectations and accountability interventions, and the adjustment variables.   
Consider the second panel, which presents the estimates of whether teachers in 
states that were early to implement accountability standards differ from later adopters.  
Compared to the results presented in Table 4.4, including the interaction effect in the 
model does not affect the main effects for either math teacher expectations or early 
implementation.  The interaction effect indicates that math teacher expectations in 
states that were early to adopt an accountability system are not more predictive of 
math test scores.  
The next two panels, which present the results for PATs and NRTs 














Table 4.5: Coefficients for Math Teacher Expectations, Accountability Interventions, 
and the Interaction Between Math Teacher Expectations and Accountability 

















Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations (MTE) 3.98 2.82 3.71 2.82 2.14 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Early Implementer 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 4.00 2.83 3.72 2.84 2.14 
 (.17) (.14) (.16) (.14) (.14) 
Early Implementer .37 .42 .38 .24 .71 
 (.61) (.43) (.46) (.42) (.42) 
Early Implementer * MTE -.04 -.01 -01 -.03 -.01 
 (.19) (.16) (.18) (.16) (.15) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Performance Assessment Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.89 2.80 3.64 2.79 2.12 
 (.09) (.09) (.09) (.08) (.09) 
PAT 1.21 .25 .00 .09 .19 
 (.55) (.44) (.44) (.42) (.39) 
PAT  * MTE .34 .13 .33 .15 .06 
 (.18) (.16) (.18) (.16) (.15) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Norm-Referenced Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.95 2.75 3.67 2.74 2.09 
 (.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.10) 
NRT -.04 -.31 -.01 -.32 -.56 
 (.52) (.35) (.41) (.37) (.36) 
NRT * MTE .06 .14 .08 .16 .08 
 (.16) (.13) (.15) (.13) (.13) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Criterion-Referenced Test 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.96 2.27 2.92 2.33 1.64 
 (.42) (.36) (.36) (.35) (.31) 
CRT -.46 1.03 1.00 1.20 1.63 
 (1.64) (1.25) (1.33) (1.24) (1.11) 
CRT * MTE 1.04 .57 .81 .50 .51 







 Accountability Intervention:  
Exit Exam 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.96 2.80 3.67 2.80 2.05 
 (.13) (.12) (.12) (.12) (.12) 
Exit Exam -.72 .86 .68 .94 1.19 
 (.57) (.39) (.41) (.37) (.37) 
Exit Exam * MTE .03 .04 .06 .04 .12 
 (.17) (.14) (.15) (.14) (.13) 
      
 Accountability Intervention:  
Testing Index 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations 3.97 2.83 3.72 2.83 2.14 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
Testing Index -.25 .23 .41 .30 .31 
 (.26) (.20) (.21) (.20) (.19) 
Testing Index * MTE .08 .08 .10 .08 .08 
 (.08) (.07) (.08) (.07) (.07) 
      
      
Student Characteristics      
Teacher Characteristics      
School Characteristicsa      
9th Grade GPA      
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 4.3 notes. 
a Region is not included as an adjustment variable. 
 
of the coefficients for the direct effects.  Math teacher expectations continue to be 
strong predictors of tenth grade math test scores, whereas PATs are associated with 
slightly higher test scores and NRTs are associated with lower test scores.  The 
coefficients for the interaction effects indicate that math teacher expectations are 
slightly more predictive of math test scores in states that use PATs or NRTs.  
Shifting focus to CRTs, the results presented in the fourth panel show that the 
relationship between math teacher expectations and student achievement is stronger in 
states that use CRTs.  Recall from Table 4.4 that the base estimates for math teacher 
expectations and CRTs were 3.98 and -.43, respectively (see Unadjusted Model).  The 
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analogous results presented in Table 4.5 show that including the interaction effect in 
the model affects the size of the coefficient for math teacher expectations but not 
CRTs.  For example, not adjusting for any of the predictor variables, the direct effect 
for math teacher expectations is 2.96 and the interaction effect is 1.04 (see Unadjusted 
Model), suggesting that math teacher expectations most strongly predict math test 
scores in states that use CRTs.  The size of the interaction effect is reduced by half 
from 1.04 to .57 when adjusting for student and teacher characteristics (see Model 1), 
and only slightly to .81 when adjusting for school characteristics only (see Model 2).  
The results presented in Model 4 show that math teacher expectations more strongly 
predict math test scores in states that use CRTs, even after prior academic 
performance is taken into account. 
Now consider the coefficients for exit exams.  Many states require that 
students pass an exit exam in order to graduate, therein introducing motivation to do 
well.  The direct effect for exit exams shows that math test scores are slightly higher in 
states that require students to pass an exit exam, suggesting that students are aware of 
the consequences of poor performance.  The interaction effects, on the other hand, 
indicate that teacher expectations are not substantially higher in states that require 
students to pass an exit exam.   
Whereas exit exams have consequences for poor performance, frequent testing 
is another means of closely monitoring students.  In other words, teacher expectations 
in states that rely heavily on testing (e.g., North Carolina and California) may be more 
predictive of student achievement because they have more information about student 
performance.  The findings presented in the bottom panel show that testing frequency 
is positively associated with tenth grade math test scores, as indicated by the slightly 
positive direct effects.  However, similar to the results for exit exams, testing 
frequency has no impact on teachers’ influence on student achievement.  
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The results presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that accountability 
interventions may in fact increase student achievement, but not necessarily because 
teachers are raising their expectations.  First, accountability testing is associated with 
slightly higher math test scores, although the achievement gains tend to be quite small.  
Second, math teacher expectations continue to be strongly associated with math test 
scores.  Third, the findings presented in Table 4.5 show that the strength of the 
association between math teacher expectations and math test scores differs according 
to accountability intervention status, thus suggesting that teachers use information 
from accountability tests to adjust their expectations for students.  The pattern of the 
strength in the relationship between accountability interventions and math teacher 
expectations is strongest for CRTs, then PATs, NRTs, and exit exams.   
Why do math teachers appear to adjust their expectations to CRTs but not any 
of the other characteristics of accountability interventions?  Recall that the CRT 
movement began in response to increased demand for improved student performance, 
especially among low-income, minority children.  Accordingly, states that use CRTs 
are more likely to have lower average socioeconomic status.  In turn, math teacher 
expectations in states that use CRTs are more predictive of math test scores because 
teachers calibrate (and potentially over-adjust) their expectations for poor students to 
make them more realistic.  
Are accountability standards too high for the average student to meet?  When 
first introduced, accountability systems targeted low-performing students under the 
guise that introducing achievement goals would create an incentive for students to 
want to do well, which would in turn raise student achievement.  However, increasing 
evidence suggests that teachers interact differently with high- and low-performing 
students, such that teachers are more likely to favor better students.  If teachers do in 
fact hold students to different standards, then teachers may respond differently to 
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accountability interventions.  In the next section, I revisit the analysis presented in 
Table 4.3, and examine whether teachers’ responses to accountability interventions 
differ for high- and low-performing students.   
 
Do Teachers Calibrate Their Responses to Accountability Interventions? 
As discussed in Chapter 3, some research suggests that teachers’ interactions 
with high- and low-expectancy students differ according to their expectations of 
students.  Research also suggests that teachers’ responses to accountability 
interventions may differ for high- and low-performing students (Hamilton et al. 2007).  
Table 4.6 examines whether teachers’ responses to accountability interventions differs 
for low- and high-performing students.  For this analysis I revisit the analysis 
presented in Table 4.3 and regress math teacher expectations on the accountability 
interventions separately for the bottom quartile, bottom half, and top half of students.  
In particular, I use tenth grade math test scores to identify the three achievement 
groups from within each race group.  I then aggregated the students according to their 
respective achievement group.  As a result, the top and bottom half achievement 
groups have identical distributions of students by race.  I use this within-race group 
strategy to identify the achievement groups because low-performing students are much 
more likely to be black or Hispanic, and therefore the results are not solely a function 
of student race.10   
Comparing the coefficients for each achievement group, the results suggest 
that teachers take into account the quality of their students when assessing the 
likelihood that the students will meet performance expectations.  For example, math 
teacher expectations in early adopter states are slightly higher for the lower 
                                                        
10 Additional analysis show that separating the sample according to the full distribution rather than by 
race group produces the same results.   
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performing students than for their higher performing counterparts.  By contrast, NRTs 
are associated with lower math teacher expectations, especially for the higher 
performing students.  It is possible that math teachers lower their expectations for 
students because NRT scores convey to teachers very little about actual student 
knowledge.  CRTs, on the other hand, reduce teacher expectations for low-performing 
students, but have no effect on expectations for high-performing students.  The even 
larger coefficient for the bottom quartile of students further suggests that math 
teachers use test scores to justify their already low expectations of low-performing 
students. Given that most states administer CRTs, these findings contradict the claim 
that pressuring teachers to raise their expectations will raise student achievement.  
Rather, teachers may actually lower their expectations, especially for the lowest 
performing students.  Although weaker, exit exams have a similar influence on math 
teacher expectations insofar as math teacher expectations are slightly lower for the 
lower performing students only.  Finally, neither PATs nor testing frequency have a 
strong association with math teacher expectations, which is not surprising given that 
the associations presented in Table 4.3 were already weak.  
In sum, further examination of the relationship between accountability 
interventions and math teacher expectations suggests that teachers take into account 
student performance when responding to accountability expectations.  In other words, 
teachers adjust their expectations for students differently by student performance.  For 
example, recall from Table 4.3 that math teacher expectations are slightly lower in 
states that use CRTs.  The findings presented in Table 4.6 show that this negative 
association is a function of teachers calibrating their expectations such that they are 
more realistic, or less hopeful, of student performance.  In other words, pressuring 
teachers to raise their expectations for low-performing students is difficult because 
teachers weigh evidence differently across student-performance levels. 
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Table 4.6: Accountability Intervention Coefficients from Regression Models 
Predicting Math Teacher Expectations, Separately for the Bottom Quartile, Bottom 
Half, and Top Half of Students 
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
Early Implementer .19  .07  -.06 
 (.10)  (.08)  (.08) 
      
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
PAT .05  -.04  .01 
 (.10)  (.08)  (.07) 
      
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
NRT -.09  -.03  -.19 
 (.09)  (.07)  (.07) 
      
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
CRT -.44  -.35  .00 
 (.25)  (.16)  (.16) 
      
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
Exit Exam -.05  -.11  .01 
 (.09)  (.07)  (.07) 
      
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
Testing Index -.03  -.04  -.07 
 (.05)  (.04)  (.03) 
      
      
Student Characteristics      
Teacher Characteristics      
Ubanicity, School Enrollment, and 
Number of Full-Time Teachers 
     
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 4.3 notes.  N = 2,231 students enrolled in 507 schools for the bottom quartile, N = 
4,455 students enrolled in 548 schools for the bottom half, and N = 4,490 students enrolled in 549 
schools for the top half of the distribution.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Scholarship on accountability testing is still in its infancy.  The extant research 
primarily examines the association between accountability system characteristics and 
student achievement, attributing changes to accountability interventions.  However, it 
is not easy to make causal claims because it is difficult to identify causal mechanisms 
(Schiller and Muller 2003).  Too often, research ignores the social processes between 
state-level achievement expectations and student achievement.  In this chapter I 
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examined the role of teachers, first by examining how they respond to accountability 
interventions, and second by examining if teachers communicate accountability 
expectations to students.  Rather than treat all accountability systems as 
interchangeable, I also examined how teacher responses vary by characteristics of 
accountability systems.  
The results show that math teachers respond adversely to accountability 
interventions, at least in adjusting their expectations of students.  They tend to 
decrease, rather than increase, their expectations of students, especially the low-
performing students.  Overall, I find some evidence of an accountability effect on 
student achievement, but the effect tends to be small.  I also find some evidence that 
teachers communicate accountability expectations to students, but that teachers appear 
to calibrate their expectations differently for low- and high-performing students.  
Thus, the findings suggest that teachers mediate accountability expectations, and, as a 
result, not all students benefit equally from accountability interventions.   
These findings may partly explain why recent attempts to increase 
accountability expectations have failed to substantially narrow achievement gaps.  If 
anything, increasing accountability testing provides teachers with additional 
information to justify their already low expectations or lower their expectations even 
more.  For the lowest performing students, teachers’ even lower expectations may 
translate to a harsh reality insofar as students accept their teachers’ low expectations as 
their own.  Thus, it is not necessarily the “soft bigotry of low expectations” that 
policymakers should be concerned about, but rather the “hard bigotry of low 
expectations” or the “harsh reality of diminished expectations.”  In the next chapter, I 
revisit the analyses from Chapters 3 and 4, focusing on how student race determines 
teacher expectations, which in turn affects the race achievement gap.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DO TEACHERS’ RESPONSES TO ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS 
CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVEMENT GAPS BETWEEN WHITE, BLACK, AND 
HISPANIC STUDENTS? 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I examined the association between teacher expectations 
and student achievement and then how accountability interventions impact this 
relationship.  The findings confirm that teacher expectations are strong predictors of 
student achievement, but offer little evidence that teachers respond positively to state 
pressure to raise their expectations for students.  In fact, the analysis presented in 
Chapter 4 suggests that rather than raising their expectations of students, teachers 
appear to use the information gathered from tests to lower their expectations or to 
justify their already low expectations of students.   
One of the primary goals of policymakers is to close the achievement gaps 
between white, black, and Hispanic students.  Figure 5.1 presents math and reading 
test score trends by race for students aged 17 years from the mid-1970s to 2008 
(NCES 2010).  It shows that white and Asian students continue to outperform black 
and Hispanic students in both math and reading.  Whereas average test scores for 
white and Asians students have remained relatively constant over time, test scores for 
black and Hispanic students increased slightly between the 1980s and 1990s, but have 
remained relatively constant over the past two decades.  A closer examination reveals 
that the decline in the black-white achievement gap was due primarily to greater test 
score gains among the lowest performing black students, which Hedges and Nowell 






Figure 5.1: NAEP Math and Reading Test Score Trends for Students Aged 17 Years, 
by Race-Ethnicity 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics (2010) 
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expectations.  However, despite their achievement gains, black children start 
elementary school one year behind their white peers in skills.  By the time they finish 
high school, black students trail white students by four years in skills (Phillips, 
Crouse, and Ralph 1998).  Even if they start elementary school with the same math, 
reading, and vocabulary skills, the achievement gap widens over time such that at high 
school completion, nearly one half of the black-white test score gap can be attributed 
to the initial gap when students start school (Phillips et al. 1998).  The race gaps in test 
scores are visible in other education outcomes.  For example, black and Hispanic 
students are much more likely to be retained and drop out of school than their white 
counterparts (NCES 2010). 
Scholars have offered many explanations for the overall lower performance of 
black and Hispanic students, including biological differences, neighborhood and 
school effects, resource deprivation, differences in learning opportunities, and 
adopting an oppositional culture.  Recently, they have directed more attention to the 
student-teacher relationship, arguing that a student’s race affects how teachers 
perceive and interact with students.  In the remainder of this chapter I discuss the 
literature on student race and the student-teacher relationship.  I then revisit the 
findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and examine how student race determines 
teacher expectations and whether the ways in which teachers mediate accountability 
expectations differs by students race.   
 
STUDENT RACE AND THE STUDENT-TEACHER RELATIONSHIP 
Racial achievement gaps have created a legacy of expectations whereby 
teachers associate student race with certain behaviors and achievement expectations 
that may not be associated with actual performance and ability (Correll and Ridgeway 
2003).  Figlio (2005) shows that teachers form achievement expectations from as little 
 86 
information as a student’s race-typed name.  The literature on the student-teacher 
relationship offers abundant evidence that teachers are more likely to perceive black 
and Hispanic students as being more disruptive and less academically oriented, even if 
they exhibit more pro-school behavior (Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey 1998; 
Downey and Pribesh 2004; Farkas, Grobe, Sheehan, and Shuan 1990; Ferguson 2000; 
Ferguson 1998; Porter, Floden, Freeman, Schmidt, and Schwille 1988).  Teachers also 
tend to have less confidence in black students’ ability to learn difficult material (Prime 
and Miranda 2006).  Teachers’ own race may affect their perceptions of black and 
Hispanic students (Downey and Pribesh 2004; Ehrenberg, Goldhaber, and Brewer 
1985), and white teachers’ more negative perceptions of black students may be 
evidence of white teacher bias rather than students’ oppositional culture (Downey and 
Pribesh 2004).  
Teachers’ perceptions of student ability and their expectations affect how they 
interact with students (Ferguson 2003; Porter et al. 1988; Rubovits and Maehr 1973; 
Tenenbaum and Ruck 2007) and the amount of effort they put into helping their 
students (Diamond, Randolph, and Spillane 2004; Prime and Miranda 2006).  In their 
meta-analysis of teacher expectations, Tenenbaum and Ruck (2007) find evidence that 
teachers offer more positive feedback to white students, on average, than to their black 
and Hispanic peers.  In their analysis of urban elementary schools, Diamond and 
colleagues (2004) argue that teacher expectations and their sense of responsibility for 
student learning are related to the student composition.  They find evidence that 
teachers in schools with greater proportions of African American children (to white 
children) tend to have lower overall expectations of students, African American and 
white, and to feel less responsible for student learning.  They are also more likely to 
attribute the poor performance of their low-income, black students to factors unrelated 
to learning, such as students’ lives outside of school.   
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For example, Ann Ferguson’s (2000) Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making 
of Black Masculinity describes how teachers in an urban school near Los Angeles go 
so far as to single out black children and treat them as adults.  In her book, Ferguson 
describes how teachers openly admit to believing that their students are destined for 
lives of crime and poverty and treating them as such.  Students, even the high 
achievers, responded by assuming the role their teachers defined for them, thus 
confirming their teachers’ beliefs and perpetuating a legacy of race-based 
expectations.  Teachers who behave in similar ways as those described in Ferguson’s 
book actually create a self-fulfilling prophecy, which brings to question whether 
accountability interventions effectively pressure teachers to adjust their expectations 
for students.  The remainder of this chapter examines how student race affects the 
student-teacher relationship and how teachers respond to accountability pressure. 
 
RESULTS 
 In the remainder of this chapter I examine how student race affects (1) teacher 
expectations of students’ future educational attainment, (2) teachers’ responses to 
accountability interventions, (3) the association between teacher expectations and 
student achievement, and (4) if teachers communicate accountability expectations to 
students.  I present only the main findings, focusing the discussion on four race/ethnic 
groups: white, black, Hispanic, and Asian students.  [See Appendix D for additional 
analysis as well as results for Native American and multiracial students.] 
Before examining how student race influences teacher expectations, it is worth 
considering how students differ by race/ethnicity.  Table 5.1 presents the means and 
standard deviations for the primary outcome and explanatory variables separately for 
white, black, Hispanic, and Asian students.  Consider first race differences in math test 
scores.  Recall from Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 that the full analysis analytic sample (N = 
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8,945) has an average tenth grade math test score of 41.96 points, with a standard 
deviation of 14.14.  Table 5.1 shows that this average result masks substantial race 
differences in math test scores.  White and Asian students scored an estimated average 
of 4.03 and 5.71 points above the sample mean, or .29 and .40 standard deviations 
respectively.  In contrast, black and Hispanic students scored an estimated average of 
8.83 and 6.91 points below the sample mean, or .62 and .49 standard deviations 
respectively.  The mean twelfth grade math test scores and test score gains follow a 
similar pattern, where Asian students have the highest average math test scores, 
followed by white students, then Hispanic and black students.  
Math teacher expectations of students also differ substantially by student race.  
On average, teachers expect black and Hispanic students to complete an additional two 
years of schooling beyond high school, or 14.06 and 14.12 years respectively.  Math 
teachers expect white and Asian students, by contrast, to complete an average of three 
to four years of post-secondary schooling, or 15.05 and 15.86 years respectively.  
Assuming that math teacher expectations are accurate, predictions of expected years of 
schooling, and that students meet but do not exceed their teacher’s expectations, this 
race difference translates into the difference between obtaining an Associate’s degree 
versus a Bachelor’s degree.  Considering the returns to education, the difference 
between a Bachelor’s degree and Associate’s degree has potentially serious 
implications for racial inequality (Kane and Rouse 1995). 
The remainder of Table 5.1 presents evidence of race-based differences on 
other dimensions related to educational achievement.  For example, Hispanic and 
black students have slightly lower socioeconomic status.  Black students are the least 
likely to live in two-parent families and are the most likely to have been held back a 
grade and/or to have had a behavior problem in the past.  Hispanic students are the 















Table 5.1: Means and Standard Deviations for the Primary Variables of Interest, 























 White  Black 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Achievement Test Scores      
IRT estimated number right (10th grade)  45.99 13.35  33.13 11.06 
IRT estimated number right (12th grade) 50.99 14.53  37.04 12.32 
Gain Score (12th – 10th grade right) 4.52 6.54  3.97 5.26 
Math Teacher Expectations (in years) 15.05 2.00  14.06 2.12 
Female .50   .50  
Family Background      
Mother’s education (in years) 13.81 2.21  13.37 2.28 
Father’s education (in years) 13.94 2.50  13.33 2.49 
SEI score of mother’s occupation in 2002 (GSS 1989 
coding) 
46.93 13.01  42.97 12.29 
SEI score of father’s occupation in 2002 (GSS 1989 
coding) 
45.84 11.73  41.67 10.96 
Family income (natural log) 10.86 .84  10.11 1.42 
Two-parent family .80   .50  
Academic Past (as reported by parent)      
Learning disability .13   .13  
Ever in remedial math .09   .12  
Ever held back  .10   .23  
Ever have behavior problem .07   .14  
Academic Track (Academic is the reference category)      
General .40   .34  
Vocational .09   .17  
Math Teacher Characteristics      
Female .57   .56  
Black .02   .21  
Hispanic .02   .05  
Asian .01   .04  
Native American .01   .00  
Multiracial .01   .02  
Age (in years) 42.42 11.14  43.47 11.14 
Certified degree or higher .54   .51  
Teaching experience (in years) 14.92 10.42  15.58 10.88 
Urbanicity (Suburban is the reference category)      
Urban .17   .48  
Rural .28   .11  
Region (Midwest is the reference category)      
Northeast .19   .17  
South .32   .58  
West .18   .07  
School Characteristics      
School enrollment 1304.25 754.32  1475.46 724.46 
Full-time teachers 75.95 40.46  85.47 37.99 
Percent minority 20.14 19.74  61.57 27.60 
Percent free-lunch 16.05 12.78  37.33 21.29 
Percent college prep 57.92 28.75  49.47 28.03 
Percent general track 48.66 35.44  49.94 30.20 
Percent vocational track 17.41 19.91  21.70 22.14 
Percent remedial math 6.45 8.71  7.04 10.08 




 Hispanic  Asian 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Achievement Test Scores      
IRT estimated number right (10th grade)  35.05 12.54  47.67 15.75 
IRT estimated number right (12th grade) 39.87 13.77  53.98 16.90 
Gain Score (12th – 10th grade) 4.47 6.38  5.12 8.10 
Math Teacher Expectations (in years) 14.12 2.06  15.86 2.15 
Female .51   .50  
Family Background      
Mother’s education (in years) 12.17 2.24  13.57 2.73 
Father’s education (in years) 12.34 2.45  14.24 3.06 
SEI score of mother’s occupation in 2002  40.01 11.40  43.59 12.10 
SEI score of father’s occupation in 2002  40.19 10.44  45.00 12.47 
Family income (natural log) 10.19 1.38  10.33 1.53 
Two-parent family .76   .84  
Academic Past (as reported by parent)      
Learning disability .11   .07  
Ever in remedial math .10   .08  
Ever held back  .16   .09  
Ever have behavior problem .09   .05  
Academic Track       
General .44   .31  
Vocational .15   .11  
Math Teacher Characteristics      
Female .50   .56  
Black .06   .04  
Hispanic .19   .05  
Asian .04   .13  
Native American .02   .01  
Multiracial .03   .04  
Age (in years) 42.39 11.21  42.68 11.00 
Certified degree or higher .54   .57  
Teaching experience (in years) 13.06 10.28  14.43 10.33 
Urbanicity       
Urban .46   .43  
Rural .09   .09  
Region      
Northeast .14   .19  
South .29   .18  
West .45   .47  
School Characteristics      
School enrollment 1985.50 962.50  1970.96 879.27 
Full-time teachers 104.15 47.00  100.86 41.16 
Percent minority 63.01 28.14  53.32 29.15 
Percent free-lunch 36.08 21.75  22.82 18.02 
Percent college prep 50.73 30.59  59.43 31.24 
Percent general track 58.42 20.91  58.11 36.36 
Percent vocational track 18.37 20.91  14.63 18.56 
Percent remedial math 8.25 9.50  8.23 12.28 
9th Grade GPA 2.40 .83  2.97 .79 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2004 waves) 
Notes: See Table 3.1 notes.  For all base-year wave variables, there are 5,104 white students, 1,201 black 
students, 1,256 Hispanic students, and 875 Asian students.  For the twelfth grade test scores and math test 
score gains, the sample was restricted to respondents who were enrolled in the same school and in the twelfth 




percent of both white and black students and 60 percent of Asian students are enrolled 
in the academic track.  
These differences extend beyond student characteristics and to the types of 
schools that they attend.  In particular, black, Hispanic, and Asian students are more 
likely to attend urban schools that are more likely have high enrollment rates, 
disproportionate numbers of minority students, and high poverty rates.  Asian and 
Hispanic students are concentrated in the West, while black students are more likely to 
live in the South.  White students, on the other hand, are more likely to attend 
predominantly white, suburban schools in the Midwest and South.  Next, I examine 
whether teachers take into account these differences when constructing their 
expectations of students’ future educational attainment.  In other words, conditional on 
student race, do teachers offer more (or less) weight to particular characteristics? 
 
Does Student Race Influence Teacher Expectations of Students’ Future 
Educational Attainment? 
To address this question, I regress math teacher expectations on the student, 
teacher, and school predictor variables separately by student race.  The models 
presented in Table 5.2 are analogous to those presented in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, 
where Model 1 includes student characteristics only, Model 2 adds teacher 
characteristics, and Model 3 adds school characteristics.  Models 3b and 4 are 
presented as additional tests of the Model 3 findings.  Model 3b tests the robustness of 
the Model 3 findings by adjusting for school-level fixed-effects.  Model 4 adds ninth 
grade GPA as a measure of prior academic performance.  I estimate the models 
separately for each race group in order to examine whether teachers use different 
criteria to construct their expectations.   
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I turn first to the Model 1 coefficients, a model in which math teacher 
expectations are regressed on student characteristics only.  The coefficients show that 
teachers hold students from different race groups to slightly different standards.  For 
example, compared the their male counterparts, math teacher expectations are slightly 
higher for female students.  This difference is largest among Asian students, where 
females are expected to complete .41 years of schooling more.  Teachers do not seem 
to weigh mother’s and father’s education and occupational prestige differently across 
race groups, but there are slight differences in their sensitivity to students’ family 
income and to students.  In particular, teachers respond more positively to affluent 
white and black students than to affluent Asian or Hispanic students.  The family 
structure coefficients indicate that teacher expectations are slightly higher for white 
students who come from a two-parent family.  Although subtle, these differences show 
evidence that teachers consider students’ family backgrounds when considering how 
far in school they expect students to go.   
The largest disparities between race groups pertain to students’ academic past, 
which suggests that teachers are more (or less) forgiving of students with troubled 
academic histories.  For example, teachers penalize white and Asian students who 
have a learning disability much more than their black and Hispanic counterparts, in 
part because white and Asian students have more to lose insofar as they tend to have 
higher test scores than black and Hispanic students. Having been enrolled in remedial 
math in the past has no influence on teacher expectations for Asian students, but is 
associated with a .5-year decrease in teacher expectations for white, black, and 















Table 5.2: Coefficients from Regression Models Predicting Math Teacher 
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Teacher Characteristics          
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higher 


















          
          
Constant 15.56 14.70 14.68 16.07  15.38 14.26 14.29 16.14 
R2 .28 .16 .16 .18  .29 .20 .18 .22 
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Table 5.2: Continued 
 Model 3  Model 3b 
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9th Grade GPA          
          
          
Constant 15.36 14.05 14.56 15.51  15.39 15.43 14.25 16.28 




Table 5.2: Continued 
 Model 4 
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Table 5.2: Continued 










































School Composition     








































































     
     
Constant 15.31 13.92 14.67 15.60 
R2 .47 .35 .36 .46 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  






to complete 1.07 and .82 years of schooling less, versus a decrease of .56 and .54 for 
black and Asian students, respectively.  These findings offer evidence that conditional 
on student race, teachers may be more inclined to forgive certain behaviors.  This 
result is consistent with other scholarship that shows that teachers are most supportive 
of high-expectancy students when they show signs of achievement gains, but are more 
critical of low expectancy students when the students show greater-than-expected 
achievement gains (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968).  The results also show slight 
differences in the rate at which teachers adjust their expectations, according to the 
academic track in which students are enrolled.  For example, white students are 
penalized more for being enrolled in the general track, and Asian students for being 
enrolled in the vocational track.   
Together, the results from Model 1 offer evidence that the criteria on which 
students are judged differs according to student race, meaning that teacher 
expectations are biased.  More specifically, teachers have pre-existing ideas of 
students’ academic abilities, which they use as a foundation for their expectations.  As 
a result, some students appear to suffer more from the negative consequences of high 
teacher expectations (e.g., Asian and white students who have a learning disability).  
The coefficients for Model 2 indicate that the differences between race groups 
are not simply a function of students having different teachers.  They offer some 
evidence, although weak, that teachers’ own characteristics influence their 
expectations for students’ future educational attainment.  For example, white, black, 
and Hispanic students with non-white teachers (i.e., black, Hispanic, or Asian) are 
held to slightly higher standards than their counterparts who have white teachers.  By 
contrast, Asian students with non-white teachers are held to lower standards, 
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especially those with a same-race math teacher.11  Together, the lower expectations for 
Asian students, in combination with the higher standards for white, black, and 
Hispanic students, suggests that math teacher expectations are not only sensitive to 
student race, but affected by racial stereotypes.   
To what extend does past performance influence these dynamics?  Model 4 
addresses this question by including ninth grade GPA as a measure of students’ past 
performance.  As in Chapter 3, including prior academic performance in the model 
reduces the size of the estimated effect of the student predictor variables, especially 
the past history and track variables.  It does not, however, explain the association away 
entirely.  Thus, prior academic performance continues to be an important signal for 
teachers.   
 
Race Differences in Teacher Expectations: Do Accountability Interventions Make a 
Difference? 
Are teachers responding to accountability interventions?  In other words, are 
accountability interventions pressuring teachers to raise their expectations of 
traditionally low-performing students?  In this section, I offer two analyses that 
investigate whether teachers’ responses to accountability interventions differ by 
student race.  To this end, Table 5.3 presents the coefficients from regression models 
predicting math teacher expectations.  Similar to Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, each type of 
accountability intervention is modeled separately.   
Three models are presented for each type of intervention, all of which adjust 
for the student, teacher, and school level predictor variables.  Model 1 (which 
                                                        
11 These findings should be interpreted with caution because the proportion of students with non-white 
teachers is quite small.  For example, the results suggest that math teacher expectations are substantially 
low for black students who have a Native American teacher.  Additional analysis (not presented) shows 
that removing the dummy variable for Native American teachers does not affect the results.   
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corresponds to Model 3 from Table 4.3 in Chapter 4) includes a dummy variable for 
each race group and accountability intervention.  Model 2 adds an interaction term 
between each race category and accountability intervention in order to examine how 
teacher responses to accountability interventions differ by student race.  And Model 3 
adds prior academic performance to the Model 2 specification.  Unlike the analysis 
presented in Table 5.2, which estimated models separately by student race, the 
analyses presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 employ the full analytic sample (N = 8,945).12   
Before discussing the findings for each accountability intervention, it is worth 
considering how adding the accountability intervention measures to the models affects 
the relationship between race and math teacher expectations.  Recall Model 3 from 
Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, where math teacher expectations were regressed on student, 
teacher, and school characteristics: these results showed that math teacher expectations 
for black and Hispanic students were lower than for whites and Asian students.  
Adding the accountability intervention variables to the model (see Table 5.3 models) 
does not affect either the direction or the size of the student race coefficients, 
indicating that student race is an important predictor of teacher expectations, 
regardless of accountability systems.  Models 2 and 3, however, suggest that some of 
the association between student race and teacher expectations is attributed to teachers’ 
responses to accountability pressure, as indicated by the interaction terms.  In other 
words, accountability interventions increase the strength of the association between 
student race and math teacher expectations.  Race thus influences teacher expectations 
both directly and indirectly.   
Next I consider how teachers respond to pressure to raise their expectations of 
students.  The findings discussed in Chapter 4 (also presented in Model 1 of Table 5.3) 
                                                        
12 The coefficients for Native American and multiracial students are suppressed in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
See Table C2 in Appendix C for results from models where each race is modeled separately.  
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show that how math teachers respond to accountability pressure is a function of the 
type or strength of accountability intervention.  Math teachers either do not respond at 
all or lower their expectations of students.  Models 2 and 3 show that student race is an 
important determinant of how math teachers respond to pressure to raise their 
expectations. CRTs are a typical case.  Adjusting for the predictor variables only, 
CRTs are associated with a .17-year decrease in math teacher expectations (see Model 
1).  Model 2, however, shows that teachers’ responses vary substantially according to 
student race.  The main effect indicates that math teacher expectations are .21-years 
lower for white students in states that use CRTs.  Teachers in states that use CRTs 
expect black students to complete nearly one year less of schooling (i.e., -.21 - .70 = -
.91) than their same-race peers in states that do not use CRTs.  By contrast, teachers 
expect Asian and Hispanic students to complete 1.44 (i.e., -.21 + 1.65 = 1.44) and .28 
(i.e., -.21 + .49 = .28) years of schooling more than their same-race peers in states that 
do not use CRTs.  Adjusting for prior academic performance explains away the size of 
the direct effect, but not the interaction effects.  In other words, student race is an 
important determinant of how teachers respond to accountability pressure.  Although 
the associations for the other accountability characteristics are quite small, they offer 
additional support for the findings presented in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, where I found 
that teachers do not raise their expectations for all students.   
 The findings presented so far have specifically looked at the importance of 
student race as a determinant of math teacher expectations.  They offer ample 
evidence that teachers hold black and Hispanic students to lower standards and that 
pressuring teachers to raise their expectations may in fact have the opposite effect, 
which may exacerbate the black-white achievement gap.  Historically, black and 














Table 5.3: Coefficients for Student Race, Accountability Interventions, and the 
Interaction Between Student Race and Accountability Interventions from Models 
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Early Implementer 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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 Accountability Intervention: 
Performance Assessment Test 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Table 5.3: Continued 
 Accountability Intervention: 
Norm-Referenced Test 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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 Accountability Intervention: 
Criterion-Referenced Test 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Table 5.3: Continued 
 Accountability Intervention: 
Exit Exam 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 

























Interaction Effect    












    
 Accountability Intervention: 
Testing Index 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 

























Interaction Effect    












    
    
Student Characteristics    
Teacher Characteristics    
School Characteristicsa    
9th Grade GPA     
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: The data are weighted by the NCES post-stratification weight (BYSTUWT) multiplied by the 
inverse probability of having non-missing information for the primary explanatory variable, math 
teacher expectations.  N = 8,945 students enrolled in 561 schools.   
a Region is not included as an adjustment variable.   
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students.  Are the findings presented so far merely a race phenomenon, or do teachers 
treat all low-performing students similarly?   
Table 5.4 re-estimates Model 2 from Table 5.3 separately for three 
achievement groups.  Similar to the analysis presented in Table 4.5 in Chapter 4, I use 
tenth grade math test scores to identify the bottom quartile, bottom half, and top half 
of students within each race group.  Look first at the top panel, which presents the 
results for early implementation.  Given the history of testing (i.e., tests were first used 
to monitor low-income student performance), it is not surprising to see that teacher 
expectations of low- and high-performing black students and low-performing Hispanic 
students are higher in states that were early adopters of accountability testing than 
their same-race peers in later adopter states.  The remaining panels suggest that math 
teachers’ lower expectations of black and Hispanic students are not simply a function 
of student performance.  Instead, teachers appear to hold black students to lower 
standards, despite their performance.  Accountability interventions are associated with 
slightly higher math teacher expectations for Hispanic students, but their expectations 
are not consistently higher for all students.   
Consider the association between CRTs and math teacher expectations for 
black and Hispanic students.  Math teacher expectations for black students in CRT 
states are consistently low for low- and high-performing students, at -1.26 for the 
bottom quartile (i.e., -.47 - .79 = -1.26), -1.25 for the bottom half (i.e., -.39 - .86 = -
1.25), and -1.08 (i.e., -.14 - .94 = -1.08) for the top half of students.  By contrast, 
CRTs are associated with higher math teacher expectations for high-performing 
Hispanic students, but not their low-performing counterparts, at -.42 for the bottom 
quartile (i.e., -.47 + .05 = -.42), -.32 (i.e., -.39 + .07 = -.32) for the bottom half, and .87 
(i.e., -.14 + 1.01 = .87) for the top half.  The coefficients also show that math teachers 













Table 5.4: Coefficients for Student Race, Accountability Interventions, and the 
Interaction Between Student Race and Accountability Interventions from Models 
Predicting Math Teacher Expectations, Separately for the Bottom Quartile, Bottom 






























 Accountability Intervention:  
Early Implementer 
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
Race      
Black -1.12 
(.26) 
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 Accountability Intervention:  
Performance Assessment Test 
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Table 5.4: Continued 
 Accountability Intervention:  
Norm-Referenced Test 
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
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 Accountability Intervention:  
Criterion-Referenced Test 
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
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Table 5.4: Continued 
 Accountability Intervention:  
Exit Exam 
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
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 Accountability Intervention:  
Testing Index 
 Bottom Quartile  Bottom Half  Top Half 
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Student Characteristics      
Teacher Characteristics      
Urbanicity, School Enrollment, and 
Number of Full-Time Teachers 
     
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 4.5 notes.  N = 2,231 for the bottom quartile, 4,455 for the bottom half, and 4,490 for 
the top half of the distribution.  N = 2,231 students enrolled in 507 schools for the bottom quartile, N = 
4,455 students enrolled in 548 schools for the bottom half, and N = 4,490 students enrolled in 549 
schools for the top half of the distribution.  
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So far, I have examined how student race influences the criteria upon which 
teachers form their expectations and teachers’ responses to accountability 
interventions.  The findings from these analyses demonstrate that student race plays an 
important role in the student-teacher relationship.  Findings from the first analysis 
offer evidence that student race affects how teachers perceive students.  Teacher 
expectations are particularly sensitive to students with academic pasts that indicate 
either learning or behavior problems.  Similar to the results presented in Chapter 4, the 
findings presented Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that teachers do not respond positively to 
accountability interventions: the race differences are persistent no matter the type or 
strength of accountability system.  That is, math teachers do not raise their 
expectations for the students that are more likely to be held to lower standards.  The 
implications of these findings for policy are discussed in the concluding chapter.  In 
the remainder of this chapter, I examine how student race affects the association 
between math teacher expectations and student achievement.   
 
Does Student Race Affect the Association Between Teacher Expectations and 
Student Achievement? 
 How do racial differences in math teacher expectations affect student 
performance?  Table 5.5 presents the coefficients for math teacher expectations 
separately by student race for three outcome variables: tenth grade math test, twelfth 
grade math test, and math test score gains (i.e., 12th – 10th grade).  The models 
presented in each panel correspond to the models presented in Table 3.4 from Chapter 
3, where the top row of each panel presents the bivariate association between math 
teacher expectations and achievement.  Models 1 through 4 include the same 
adjustment variables, as presented in Table 5.2.  
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 First, I examine the association between student race, teacher expectations, and 
tenth grade math test scores.  The coefficients from a naïve model, with no predictor 
variables, shows that teachers’ influence on student achievement varies substantially 
by student race.  Each additional year of schooling that teachers expect students to 
complete is associated with an increase of 3.94 test score points for white students, 
2.54 points for black students, 3.07 points for Hispanic students, and 4.53 points for 
Asian students.  The association for each race group decreases once student, teacher, 
and school characteristics are taken into account, but the race differences persist (see 
Models 1, 2, and 3).  The coefficients for Model 3 indicate that each additional year of 
expected schooling is associated with an increase in tenth grade math test scores of 
2.93, 1.92, 2.65, and 3.59 points for white, black, Hispanic, and Asian students, 
respectively.  These differences persist even after adjusting for school fixed-effects 
(see Model 3b).  Adding prior academic performance reduces the sizes of the 
coefficients, especially for white and Asian students (see Model 4).  Each additional 
year of schooling math teachers expect students to complete is associated with an 
increase of 2.15 and 2.73 test score points for white and Asian students respectively, 
compared to 1.88 and 2.03 points for black and Hispanic students respectively.  
The results for twelfth grade math test scores presented in the middle panel 
follow a similar pattern: Asian students benefit the most from teacher expectations, 
followed by white, Hispanic, and then black students.  For math test score gains, 
however, the results tell a slightly different story.  Unlike the tenth and twelfth grade 
findings, where black students benefitted the least from teacher expectations, the math 
gains models suggest that Hispanic students gain the least between the tenth and 
twelfth grades.  In fact, adjusting for prior academic achievement, the teacher 
expectations effect disappears entirely for Hispanic students, but not for white, black, 
or Asian students (see Model 4).  In other words, Hispanic students do not make any  
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Table 5.5: Math Teacher Expectations Coefficients from Regression Models 
Predicting 10th and 12th Grade Math Tests and Math Test Gains, Separately for White, 
Black, Hispanic, and Asian Students 
 Outcome Variable:  10th Grade Math Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
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12th Grade Math Test 
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 Outcome Variable:  
Math Gain (12th – 10th Grade Math Test) 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
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Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2004 waves) 
Notes: See Table 5.1 notes. 
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substantial achievement gains between the tenth and twelfth grades.  The coefficients 
for white and Asian students are .37 and .34, respectively, and .22 for black students. 
The findings presented in Table 5.5 demonstrate that teacher expectations may 
be biased, which contributes to the race achievement gap.  The achievement gains 
associated with teacher expectations are smaller for black and Hispanic students than 
for white and Asian students.  Given that black and Hispanic students have lower test 
scores to begin with, the smaller return to teacher expectations is particularly 
problematic for the race achievement gap.  This finding is, of course, crucial to 
whether the policy objectives of NCLB are met.  Next, I offer two final pieces of 
analysis that examine how the association between accountability interventions, math 
teacher expectations and student achievement differs by student race. 
 
Do Teachers’ Responses to Accountability Interventions Contribute to Achievement 
Gaps Between White, Black, and Hispanic Students?   
 To answer this question, I revisit the analyses presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 
in Chapter 4 to examine whether the association between accountability interventions, 
math teacher expectations, and tenth grade math test scores differs by student race.  
Table 5.6 shows results from models regressing tenth grade math test scores on 
accountability interventions, math teacher expectations, and the adjustment variables, 
separately for each race group.  Table 5.7 shows the results for a model that allows 
math teacher expectations to interact with accountability interventions.  The top panel 
of each table presents the math teacher expectations from models that do not include 
any accountability intervention variables. 
First consider how including the accountability intervention variables in the 
models affects the association between math teacher expectations and tenth grade 













Table 5.6: Coefficients for Math Teacher Expectations and Accountability 
Interventions from a Regression Model Predicting 10th Grade Math Test, Separately 































 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.93 2.26 2.63 3.81 
 (.10) (.14) (.18) (.24) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Early Implementer 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.93 2.25 2.63 3.80 
 (.10) (.14) (.18) (.24) 
Early Implementer  -.02 1.01 .06 -.46 
 (.49) (.90) (.93) (1.55) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Performance Assessment Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.93 2.26 2.63 3.80 
 (.10) (.15) (.18) (.25) 
PAT .50 -.09 -.56 -1.45 
 (.42) (.98) (1.35) (1.16) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Norm-Referenced Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.93 2.25 2.63 3.81 
 (.10) (.14) (.18 (.24) 
NRT -.20 -.34 -.69 1.40 
 (.41) (.84) (.89) (1.29) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Criterion-Referenced Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.94 2.27 2.63 3.81 
 (.10) (.14) (.18) (.24) 
CRT 1.04 5.05 1.34 -.92 
 (1.33) (2.51) (5.51) (4.33) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Exit Exam 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.93 2.25 2.63 3.92 
 (.10) (.14) (.18) (.24) 
Exit Exam .31 3.96 1.62 1.03 







 Accountability Intervention:  
Testing Index 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.94 2.27 2.63 3.82 
 (.10) (.15) (.18) (.28) 
Testing Index .13 .47 .26 1.68 
 (.25) (.30) (.44) (.61) 
     
Student Characteristics     
Teacher Characteristics     
School Characteristicsa     
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 5.1 notes. 
a Region is not included as an adjustment variable.   
 
 
accountability intervention variables does not affect the sizes of the coefficients for 
math teacher expectations.  In other words, math teacher expectations and 
accountability interventions are unrelated, but are associated with tenth grade math 
test scores. 
Now consider the association between accountability interventions and math 
test scores.  The coefficients for accountability interventions differ in both size and 
direction, thus indicating that the findings presented in Table 4.4 mask important 
differences in how students respond to accountability testing.  For example, CRTs are 
associated with higher tenth grade math test scores for white, black, and Hispanic 
students, and lower test scores for Asian students.  The sizes of the coefficients show 
that black students benefit the most from living in states that use CRTs.  Exit exams 
are also associated with higher test scores for each race group.  However, the 
coefficients show that the difference between states that do and do not use exit exams 
is largest for black students.  The remaining panels provide additional evidence of how 
the association between accountability interventions and math test scores differs by 
student race.  
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Recall from the analysis presented in Table 4.5 that math teachers adjust their 
expectations in response to accountability interventions, such that they more strongly 
predict math test scores.  Also recall the findings presented in Table 5.4, which 
provides evidence that math teachers tend to lower their expectations for the very 
students that education policy intends to help: low-performing black and Hispanic 
students.  Given the evidence presented in Chapter 4 and the findings presented in this 
chapter, does student race determine whether teachers communicate accountability 
expectations to students? 
Turn to Table 5.7, which shows results from models that include the 
interaction term between math teacher expectations and accountability interventions.  
Similar to the findings presented in Table 4.5, the coefficients for the interaction 
effects show that, in most cases, math teacher expectations more strongly predict tenth 
grade math test scores in states that use accountability interventions.  The strength of 
the association, however, differs by student race.  For example, compare main effects 
presented in Table 5.6 to those presented in Table 5.7.  Math teacher expectations in 
states that use CRTs more strongly predict math test scores for white, black, and 
Hispanic students, but not Asian students.  Similarly, math teacher expectations for 
Asian students in states that use PATs are less predictive of test scores.  Together, the 
findings presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that math teacher expectations continue 
to be strong predictors of math test scores, but how much and for whom is a function 














Table 5.7: Coefficients for Math Teacher Expectations and Accountability 
Interventions, and the Interaction Between Math Teacher Expectations and 
Accountability Interventions from Regression Models Predicting 10th Grade Math 






 Model 1 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations (MTE) 2.93 2.26 2.63 3.81 
 (.10) (.14) (.18) (.24) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Early Implementer 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.93 2.33 2.66 3.65 
 (.16) (.32) (.48) (.47) 
Early Implementer -.02 1.00 .05 -.49 
 (.49) (.92) (.92) (1.54) 
MTE * Early Implementer .01 -.10 -.03 .19 
 (.18) (.35) (.51) (.52) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Performance Assessment Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.94 2.16 2.59 3.94 
 (.12) (.15) (.18) (.26) 
PAT .50 -.03 -.63 -1.57 
 (.42) (1.01) (1.38) (1.17) 
MTE * PAT -.05 .50 .40 -.78 
 (.18) (.39) (.69) (.46) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Norm-Referenced Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.91 2.23 2.43 3.54 
 (.12) (.17) (.27) (.30) 
NRT -.20 -.34 -.64 1.40 
 (.41) (.85) (.88) (1.28) 
MTE * NRT .03 .08 .34 .47 
 (.16) (.30) (.36) (.40) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Criterion-Referenced Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.40 2.00 -1.32 6.76 
 (.40) (.56) (2.70) (1.19) 
CRT 1.11 4.65 1.65 -5.73 
 (1.30) (.2.93) (3.70) (4.34) 
MTE * CRT .56 .27 3.97 -2.96 






 Accountability Intervention:  
Exit Exam 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.87 2.12 2.23 3.64 
 (.15) (.31) (.30) (.33) 
Exit Exam .31 3.94 1.67 1.01 
 (.39) (.99) (.87) (1.45) 
MTE * Exit Exam .12 .15 .55 .27 
 (.17) (.35) (.38) (.42) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Testing Index 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Math Teacher Expectations 2.94 2.28 2.63 3.85 
 (.10) (.14) (.18) (.24) 
Testing Index .13 .49) .28 1.68 
 (.25) (.31) (.44) (.61) 
MTE * Testing Index .05 .10 .39 .22 
 (.10) (.13) (.18) (.19) 
     
Student Characteristics     
Teacher Characteristics     
School Characteristicsa     
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 5.1 notes. 




One of the main goals of accountability interventions is to pressure teachers to 
raise their expectations of traditionally low-performing groups, especially black and 
Hispanic students.  Indeed, accountability systems are often justified with reference to 
the black-white test score gap, one of the most extensively studied group differences 
in education research and a perennial concern of education policymakers.  This 
chapter examined how student race determines teacher expectations and whether 
teachers respond to accountability systems in ways that exacerbate achievement gaps 
between white, black, and Hispanic students. 
I first investigated whether teacher expectations are based upon criteria that 
differ for students of different racial groups.  The findings presented in Table 5.2 show 
that the determinants of teacher expectations differ according to a student’s race.  The 
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largest disparities between race groups pertain to a student’s academic past, which 
implies that teachers are more (or less) forgiving of students with troubled academic 
histories.  For example, having been enrolled in remedial math or having been held 
back a grade have no impact on teacher expectations of Asian students, but are 
associated with lower teacher expectations for white, black, and Hispanic students.  
The findings also show that teacher and school characteristics influence math teacher 
expectations and that there are no differences in these effects across racial groups. 
 Next, I examined the association between accountability interventions and 
teacher expectations for each race group, and I find that CRTs decrease teacher 
expectations of black students and increase their expectations of Hispanic students.  
Table 5.5 offers a closer look at this association and shows that math teacher 
expectations of black and Hispanic students in states that use CRTs do not differ for 
high- and low-performing students. They also show that high-performing Hispanic 
students in non-CRT states are subject to even lower math teacher expectations than 
their low-performing same-race peers.  These findings demonstrate that math teacher 
expectations of black and Hispanic students are influenced by stereotypes.  
I then examined how race affects the association between math teacher 
expectations and math test scores.  The findings presented in Table 5.5 show that the 
association between teacher expectations and math test scores is weakest for black and 
Hispanic students.  A closer examination shows that teacher expectations are not 
associated with achievement gains between the tenth and twelfth grades for Hispanic 
students, whereas they are for black, white, and Asian students.   
The final two pieces of analysis examined how accountability interventions 
affect student achievement.  Table 5.6 shows that the association between 
accountability interventions and tenth grade math test scores differs by student race.  I 
find that math test scores for black, Hispanic, and white students are higher in states 
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that use CRTs and exit exams.  I also find that testing frequency increases math test 
scores.  Table 5.7 then shows that strength of the association between math teacher 
expectations and math test scores differs according to accountability status.  I find that 
math teacher expectations of white, black, and Hispanic students more strongly predict 
math test scores in states that use CRTs, but not for Asian students.  
Although not presented in this dissertation, I have also applied a counterfactual 
analysis to evaluate a hypothetical scenario: if teachers were to raise their expectations 
for students normally held to low-standards (i.e., students not expected to complete 
college versus those expected to complete college), would the within-race test score 
gap decrease?  Findings from this analysis suggest that, if teachers were to raise their 
expectations, it would decrease within-race variation in test scores but would not 
sufficiently narrow the between-race gap in math test scores. 
Considered together, the findings presented in this chapter show that student 
race is an important determinant of teacher expectations, and that using accountability 
interventions to pressure teachers to raise their expectations, especially for low-
performing black students, fails to close the achievement gaps between white, black, 
and Hispanic students.  State-level efforts to raise achievement are unsuccessful 




  CONCLUSION 
 
I draw from the teacher expectations and accountability systems literature to 
construct a comprehensive model to examine the question: Does pressuring teachers to 
raise their expectations increase student achievement?  I argue that prior research on 
accountability systems has failed to answer this question because it tends to be 
narrowly focused on the direct association between accountability interventions and 
student achievement.  By contrast, I use data drawn from the Education Longitudinal 
Study matched to a unique state-level accountability systems dataset to examine the 
student-teacher relationship in a richer way than in prior research.  The three empirical 
chapters offer detailed insight into the association between teacher expectations and 
student achievement.  In particular, this dissertation offers a systematic assessment of 
how teachers respond to accountability interventions with regard to their expectations 
for students. 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, examines the student-teacher 
relationship exclusively.  I show that math teacher expectations of students’ future 
educational attainment are influenced by student characteristics, but also by teacher 
and school characteristics.  I then show that teacher expectations are strong predictors 
of math test scores and student enrollment, net of the predictor variables.  Chapter 4 
then examines how teachers respond to accountability interventions and if they 
communicate accountability expectations to students.  The findings show that teachers 
tend to decrease their expectations of students in response to accountability testing.  
Despite the negative influence on teacher expectations for students’ future educational 
attainment, teacher expectations more strongly predict student achievement in states 
that use accountability tests.  The results suggest that, in spite of their lower 
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expectations, the association between teacher expectations and student achievement is 
stronger in these states because teachers adjust their expectations of students.  In 
particular, the results suggest that teacher expectations are significantly lower for low-
performing students.  I argue this calibration effect is evidence that teachers adjust 
their expectations according to student performance.  The third empirical chapter then 
addresses the claim that student race mediates how teachers respond to accountability 
expectations.  The findings show that teachers hold black and Hispanic students to 
lower standards than white students, and that they selectively respond to 
accountability interventions.  These lower expectations contribute to the achievement 
gaps between white, black, and Hispanic students.  
Although these findings are largely consistent with prior research, they extend 
this body of research in important ways.  Surprisingly, prior scholars and 
policymakers have failed to appreciate that pressuring teachers to raise their 
expectations has unanticipated and counterproductive consequences for the very 
students the policies are intended to help.  I find that, rather than raising their 
expectations of students, teachers appear to use the information gathered from tests to 
lower their expectations or even to justify their already low expectations of students. 
Far from alleviating what former President Bush called the “soft bigotry of low 
expectations,” accountability standards appear to produce a “hard bigotry of low 
expectations” or a “harsh reality of diminished expectations,” insofar as students adopt 
their teachers’ lower expectations as their own. 
Do these findings support Merton’s (1948) idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy?  
Assuming that students have the ability to learn and teachers’ low expectations are 
inaccurate, then yes, the findings presented in this dissertation are evidence of a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  However, it is an insidious self-fulfilling prophecy because it is in 
the opposite direction than policymakers intend.  Low teacher expectations are 
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particularly harmful for black and Hispanic students because they hold high- and low-
performing black and Hispanic students to equally low standards.  For low-performing 
students, low teacher expectations may represent a reality that they cannot escape.  
Low expectations for high-performing students, however, are “harsh” in that compete 
with students’ hopeful aspirations.  That is not to say that all calibration effects are all 
harmful.  Teachers who calibrate their expectations to student performance may steer 
students toward more realistic or attainable goals.  However, calibration effects are 
useful to the extent that are not biased and do not crush students’ own aspiration. 
If teachers are not responding to accountability pressure in ways that policy 
intends, then what, in particular, are teachers responding to and what are they 
communicating to students?  Prior research focuses primarily on the achievement 
gains associated with accountability system revisions or sanctions.  This dissertation 
focuses on the type of information gathered about students as a proxy for 
accountability pressure, and how teachers respond to such information.  For example, 
NRTs inform teachers how well their students perform relative to the national average.  
By contrast, CRTs inform teachers how well their students perform relative to state-
defined achievement standards.  Because no two states have the exact same 
accountability system and/or distribute test results in a similar manner (e.g., 
presentation of report card data), the impact of accountability expectations on student 
performance in one state cannot be extrapolated easily to performance in another state.  
To be sure, in an ideal world, we would obtain full information about how test scores 
are reported (e.g., state, school, teachers, community) and thereby locate the specific 
sanctions and/or rewards associated with the publication of the results.  Although the 
data collected for this dissertation do not allow this level of identification of the 
measures, it does offer insight about how student performance is monitored (i.e., test 
type), which in turn informs teachers of the effectiveness of their own teaching.  Given 
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that policymakers are still fine-tuning accountability systems nationwide and that the 
research on accountability systems is exploring new means of examining the effect of 
accountability interventions on student performance, the analysis presented in this 
dissertation proposes new ways to examine the impact of accountability testing on 
students.  In particular, it shows that teachers should not be ignored, given their 
keynote in translating state-level achievement expectations to expectations held for 
particular students.  
 
Policy Implications 
Whether used for assessments or accountability purposes, tests are here to stay.  
Since they were first implemented to monitor student performance in the 1970s, 
policymakers have slowly introduced incentives to increase student performance.  
Race achievement gaps have declined somewhat, but still persist.  When he enacted 
NCLB, President Bush made it teachers’ responsibility to raise student performance, 
especially that of black and Hispanic students.  At the time, the discourse used among 
education policymakers took an accusatory tone.  For example, “Teachers who believe 
that certain social groups are slower to learn – and react by lowering the bar for 
performance – rob those children of opportunities to grow intellectually and achieve 
their dreams” (U.S. Secretary of Education Paige March 2003).  Teachers opposed, 
and even resisted, the NCLB demands because they pressured teachers to compromise 
their own curricula for a system defined by test-scores, but confirmed few resources to 
help teachers meet the everyday needs of their students.   
Although pressuring teachers to increase their expectations of all students may 
not be an effective strategy to close achievement gaps, especially between white, 
black, and Hispanic students, that is not to say that tests are not useful tools.  One of 
the arguments maintained by teachers is that policymakers are too far removed from 
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schools to define realistic achievement expectations.  Research following the 
enactment of NCLB and the findings presented in this dissertation suggest that 
introducing achievement expectations does not necessarily produce the anticipated 
results.  For many low-performing schools, the achievement expectations are too 
demanding and the consequences for not meeting these expectations are too high, that 
they may resort to unorthodox behaviors, such as helping students cheat or falsifying 
test scores (Dewan 2010; Jacob and Levitt 2002) just to meet achievement standards.  
Rather than increasing the demands of teachers, policymakers need to consider the 
challenges that teachers face in the classroom and how tests can be used to identify the 
students and schools in need of additional help.  Lightening some of the burden placed 
on teachers will make them feel less pressure to “teach to the test” or to go so far as to 
fabricate student results.   
This is not to say that teachers should be permitted to hold students to different 
standards, or that teachers are not important.  In their concluding comments about the 
growth of the race achievement gap between primary and secondary school, Phillips 
and colleagues (1998) state:  
 
This does not necessarily mean that schools are a major contributor to the 
black-white test score gap.  Although blacks may attend worse schools 
than whites, may be treated differently from whites in the same schools, or 
may be less interested in school than initially similar whites, it is also 
possible that blacks’ parenting practices, peer influences, summer learning 
opportunities, or beliefs about their academic ability could explain why 
they learn less between first and twelfth grades than initially similar 
whites.   
 
The issue is not that the teachers are failing to do their jobs effectively as much as it is 
that teachers face too many challenges that accountability expectations ignore.  
Among many other things, teachers compete against limited school resources, low 
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student motivation, and parents’ expectations of students.  Accordingly, improving 
student performance requires engaging all the parties involved: students, parents, 
educators, and policymakers.  Teachers need to communicate to policymakers how the 
daily challenges they face in and out of the classroom prevent them from meeting 
achievement expectations.  Improved communication between teachers and 
policymakers will not only help alleviate teachers’ frustrations, but will enable 
policymakers to propose an accountability agenda that teachers support.  In fact, the 
current administration is using NCLB as an example of how not to use tests and is 
approaching testing more cautiously.  President Obama’s policy has shifted away from 
sanctions and focuses more on working with teachers, allowing them the time to 
prepare to meet the needs of their students in accordance with achievement 
expectations.  It also focuses more on rewards rather than sanctions, which relaxes 
some of the frustrations that teachers feel about meeting achievement demands 
(Abrams et al. 2003; Linn 1994; Taylor et al. 2003), and improves the motivation of 
both teachers and students.  In theory, a system that rewards student performance 
encourages teachers to adopt hopeful expectations of students.  By contrast, teachers 
in a system that sanctions poor performance are prone lower expectations because the 
costs of not meeting accountability expectations are too high.  
Are hopeful expectations more effective than realistic expectations?  At the 
level of social interaction, teachers communicate their expectations to students and 
students respond accordingly, and vice versa.  For example, a study by Madon and 
colleagues (2001) shows that teacher expectations are self-fulfilling because their 
initial perceptions of students are based upon valid information.  They argue that self-
fulfilling prophecies exist simultaneously to student self-verification.  In other words, 
teachers’ initial perceptions influence students’ own perceptions at the same time that 
students’ initial perceptions influence teachers’ perceptions of students.  Thus, in order 
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for hopeful expectations to be effective, teachers must be able to communicate them to 
students in a way such that the students believe that they are able to perform better.  
The increased emphasis on test scores not only undermines teachers’ own beliefs 




DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EDUCATION LONGITUDINAL 
STUDY AND THE ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
 
Table A1 presents the distribution of the public school students according to 
the NCES status variable F1UNIV2B, which categorizes base-year wave students 
according to their 2004 enrollment status.  I make an additional distinction between 
non-transfer and transfer students because ELS imputed twelfth grade math test scores 
for students who transferred schools.  I used the information presented in Table A1 to 
construct an eight-category status variable: In school, in grade 12, non-transfer; In 
school, in grade 12, transfer; In school, out of grade 12, non-transfer; In school, out of 
grade 12, transfer; Homeschooled/out of scope; Early graduate; Dropout; and 
Nonrespondent/F1 status unknown.  Table A2 presents the distribution by status of the 
teacher questionnaire component.  Seventeen percent of the students have math 
teachers who did not complete a questionnaire, and of those whose teacher did 
complete a questionnaire, about eight percent have missing information for math 
teacher expectations.  
Because the 2004 wave was conducted during the spring of 2004 when 
students were still enrolled in school, constructed a more specific enrollment status 
variable for the models that examine the likelihood of students graduating on time, 
being held back a grade, or dropping out of school.  For this variable, I used the 2006 
wave status variable F2F1GRD as well as the 2004 wave status variable F1UNIV2B to 
construct a graduation status variable.  Table A3 presents the distribution of students 
according to their 2004 graduation status (used to construct an adjustment weight), and 








Table A1: Base-Year to First Follow-Up Enrollment Status (F1UNIV2B) by School 
Type 
 Public  Catholic  Private 
 Non-
transfer Transfer  
Non-
transfer Transfer  
Non-
transfer Transfer 
In school, in grade 12 8,808 803  1,652 140  1,063 135 
In school, out of grade 12 126 90  3 9  6 7 
Homeschooled/out of 
Scope 
98   9   31  
Early Graduate 479   8   29  
Dropout 581   8   20  
Nonrespondent/F1 status 
unknown 
976   75   80  
         
Total 11,068 893  1,755 149  1,229 142 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2004 waves) 
 
 
Table A2: Base-Year to First Follow-Up Enrollment Status and Math Teacher 









Did Not Complete 
Questionnaire 
In school, in grade 12, non-transfer 6,776 622 1,410 
In school, in grade 12, transfer 569 76 158 
In school, out of grade 12, non-
transfer 
77 13 36 
In school, out of grade 12, transfer 59 6 25 
Homeschooled/out of scope 61 13 24 
Early graduate 352 53 74 
Dropout 399 63 119 
Nonrespondent/F1 status unknown 652 97 227 
    
Total 8,945 943 2,073 





Table A3: 2004 Graduation Status by School Type and Math Teacher Questionnaire 
Status (Public School Students Only) 
 Completed 




Questionnaire but has 
Missing Teacher 
Expectations 
Did Not Complete 
Questionnaire 
Graduated on time 7,694 740 1,673 
Held back a grade 166 28 78 
Dropped out 399 63 119 
Early graduate 352 53 74 
Unknown/out of 
scope 
334 59 129 
    
Total 8,945 943 2,073 




Table A4: Collapsed 2004 Graduation Status by Math Teacher Questionnaire Status 
(Public School Students Only) 
 Completed 




Questionnaire but has 
Missing Teacher 
Expectations 
Did Not Complete 
Questionnaire 
Graduated early or on 
time 
8,046 793 1,747 
Held back a grade 166 28 78 
Dropped out 399 63 119 
Unknown/out of 
scope 
334 59 129 
    
Total 8,945 943 2,073 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2004 and 2006 waves) 
 
 
Missing Data and Sample Attrition 
All item-specific missing data was imputed using Stata's best-subset regression 
command "impute" for all scaled variables and a similar program "implog" for all 
dichotomous variables.  The "implog" program is identical to Stata's "impute" 
command except that it uses logistic regression rather than ordinary least squares 
regression.  Given the sampling design, where students and teachers are nested within 
schools, I imputed missing student, teacher, and school data separately. 
Students.  Missing data for student characteristics was imputed for students 
who participated in both the base-year wave and first follow-up wave (N = 15,236).  I 
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imputed missing information for all variables using a list of composite variables – i.e., 
student's sex, race, mother's education (in years), father's education (in years), mother's 
occupational prestige (coded in 1989 GSS), father's occupational prestige (coded in 
1989 GSS), family income (natural log), two-parent family, academic track, region, 
urbanicity, school type and school enrollment for the 2001-02 academic year.  The 
student variables imputed include: remedial math, remedial English, ever held back, 
ever have behavior problem, disability (drawn from parent survey), and ninth grade 
GPA.13  In addition to the composite variables, ninth grade GPA was imputed using 
the students' grade point average for the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades. 
Schools.  I collapsed the student-level to the school-level to impute for missing 
information at the school data (N = 751).  The variables of interest include: region, 
urbanicity, school size, number of full-time teachers, and the percent minority, free 
lunch, remedial math, remedial English, academic track, general track, and vocational 
track.  Except for region and urbanicity, which are composite variables provided by 
ELS, all school-level variables were drawn from the Common Core of Data (CCD) 
and are made available only in the restricted-use data. 
All variables were imputed using a core set of variables: urbanicity, region, 
school type, tenth grade enrollment, and school mean of student family income 
(natural log).  The variables imputed include school enrollment (CP02STEN), number 
full-time equivalent teachers (CP02FTE), percent minority (CP02MIN), and percent 
free lunch (CP02FLUN).  In addition to the core set of variables, each variable was 
                                                        
13 Both mother's and father's occupational prestige scores (in 1989 GSS scale) were recoded from their 
occupation composite variables.  Recoding occupations into prestige scores results in missing 
information for parents who indicated that they had no job, were homemakers, or were in the military.  
There are 1,389 students with missing information for their mother's occupational prestige score and 
769 with missing information for father's occupational prestige score.  Prestige scores were imputed 
using the following composite variables: gender, race, region, urbanicity, school type, family structure 
(i.e., lived with two parents, mother only, father only, or other family structure), mother's education, 
father's education, and family income (natural log). 
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imputed using the raw variables to be imputed (i.e., school variables with missing 
data). 
Teachers.  Missing math teacher information was handled differently.  Of the 
15,236 students who participated in both the base-year and first follow-up waves, 
12,925 have math teachers who completed a questionnaire (N = 9,888 public school 
students, 1,781 Catholic school students, and 1,256 private school students).  
However, there are 1,092 students (N = 943 public school students, 93 Catholic school 
students, and 56 private school students) who have missing information for the 
primary explanatory variable, math teacher expectations (see Table 2.2).  Missing data 
was not imputed for math teacher expectations (N = 8,945), but was imputed for the 
teacher variables for teachers who completed a questionnaire (N = 12,925).  Less than 
1.5 percent of math teachers had missing information for the teacher characteristics: 
gender, race, age, highest degree and teaching experience.  Information for each of 
these variables was imputed using the teacher characteristic variables, as well as 
region, urbanicity, school type, and school enrollment. 
 
Adjustment Weights 
I constructed three adjustment weights similar to those in Morgan and Todd 
(2008) to adjust for sample attrition.  The first weight adjusts for restrictions imposed 
to define the base-year analysis sample.  The second weight makes a further 
adjustment for participation in the 2004 wave, and the third weight adjusts for 2004 
enrollment status.  The adjustment weights were constructed in several steps, 
described below.   
Base-Year Weight.  The 2002 wave analysis sample is restricted to public 
school students who have valid non-missing information for the primary explanatory 
variable, teacher expectations, reducing the sample from 11,961 to 8,945 respondents.  
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There are two reasons why students may have missing information for this variable: 
(1) their math teacher did not complete a questionnaire (N = 2,073) or (2) their math 
teacher completed the questionnaire but has missing information for the primary 
explanatory variable (N = 943).   
Restricting the sample to public school students, I first estimated a logit model 
that predicted the likelihood of respondents having non-missing information for the 
primary explanatory variable:  
 
€ 
Logit(D) = X ˆ φ ,    (2.1) 
 
where  includes the variables believed to be predictors of teachers completing a 
questionnaire – predictor variables include student-level variables (e.g., sex, race, 
socioeconomic status, family structure, academic track, and if the student was ever 
been held back, ever enrolled in remedial math, ever had a behavior problem, and if 
the student has a disability), teacher-level variables (e.g., sex, race, highest degree, and 
teaching experience), and school-level variables (e.g., region, urbanicity, school size, 
number of full-time teachers, as well as the percent of the student body that was 
minority, free lunch, college prep, general, vocational, and enrolled in remedial 
math).14 
I then multiplied the NCES base-year poststratification weight (BYSTUWT) 
by the inverse probability of respondents being in the base-year wave analysis sample, 
€ 
1/ ˆ p 1, thus giving more weight to respondents who were not in the analysis sample.                                                          
14 The likelihood of teachers completing a questionnaire is partially dependent upon their own 
characteristics.  However, students whose teachers did not complete a questionnaire have missing 
information for all the teacher-level variables.  I imputed all missing information for the teacher-level 
variables, and then estimated the probability of students having valid information for the primary 
explanatory variable.  I estimated a preliminary model that did not include teacher-level information, 
and the mean and standard deviation are similar to the fully specified model. The comparison of the chi-
squared statistics as well as the ranges suggests that teacher characteristics matter. 
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The specified model has a chi-squared statistics of 173.75 and 41 degrees of freedom.  
The extracted 
€ 
ˆ p 1 has a mean and standard deviation of .75 and .12, respectively, with a 
minimum and maximum of .18 and .92.     
2004 Follow-Up Weight.  For models where the outcome variable is 12th grade 
math test scores or math gains (i.e., 12th – 10th grade math test score), I constructed a 
2004 follow-up weight that adjusts for sample attrition.  Using the base-year to 2004 
follow-up wave status variable (see Table 2.2), I estimated a multinomial logit model 
predicting the likelihood of respondents being in school, in grade 12, non-transfer.  I 
then multiplied the base-year weight adjustment weight by the inverse probability of 
being in the 2004 analysis sample, 
€ 
1/ ˆ p 2 .  The predictor variables include: sex, race, 
socioeconomic status, family structure, region, urbanicity, academic track, three 10th 
grade educational expectations variables (student, mother, and father), if the student 
was held back a grade, if the student had a behavior problem in the past, how often the 
student was late, absent, or skipped class, and if the student got into trouble, was 
suspended, put on probation, or transferred schools in the last year.  The chi-squared 
test statistic for the fitted model is 3436.94 with 231 degrees of freedom.  The 
extracted 
€ 
ˆ p 2 has a mean and standard deviation of .74 and .17, and a minimum and 
maximum of .0072 and .96. 
 2004 Graduation Status Weight.  I constructed a third adjustment weight used 
to model the association between teacher expectations and students’ 2004 graduation 
status using the same steps as those used to construct the 2004 follow-up weight.  The 
estimated a multinomial logit model has a chi-squared test statistic of 282.30 with 33 
degrees of freedom.  The extracted 
€ 
ˆ p 3 has a mean of .96 with a standard deviation of 




TEACHER EXPECTATIONS AND THE STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: 


















Table B1: 10th Grade Math Test Regressed on Math Teacher Expectations as well as 
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Past History (as reported by parent)      
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School Composition      
































9th Grade GPA     3.94 
(.22) 
      
      
Constant 49.01 49.02 47.76 48.41 47.59 
R2 .50 .51 .52 .58 .54 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  















Table B2: 12th Grade Math Test Regressed on Math Teacher Expectations as well as 
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9th Grade GPA     4.69 
(.29) 
      
      
Constant 53.19 53.18 52.16 53.81 51.63 
R2 .53 .54 .55 .60 .58 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2004 wave)  















Table B3: Math Test Score Gains Regressed on Math Teacher Expectations as well as 
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9th Grade GPA     .95 
     (.19) 
      
Constant 4.13 4.10 4.25 4.57 4.14 
R2 .05 .05 .06 .19 .07 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2004 wave)  











Table B4: Coefficients for Math Teacher Expectations from Logistic Regression 
Models Predicting the Likelihood of Graduating on Time, Being Held Back, and 
Dropping Out of School by Spring 2004 
 Outcome Variable: 
Graduate On Time 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations .49 .35 .36 .38 .26 
 (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
      
 Outcome Variable: 
Held Back (Out of Grade 12) 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations -.34 -.23 -.23 -.24 -.14 
 (.04) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
      
 Outcome Variable: 
Dropout 
 Unadjusted 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Math Teacher Expectations -.52 -.38 -.40 -.41 -.30 
 (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
      
      
Student Characteristics      
Teacher Characteristics      
School Characteristics      
9th Grade GPA      
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2006 waves)  
Notes: The enrollment status variables are restricted to base-year wave respondents whose 2004 status 
was known, and therefore the sample is reduced to 8,611 students enrolled in 561 schools.  For these 
variables, the data are weighted by the base-year adjustment weight multiplied by the inverse 






DO TEACHERS’ RESPONSES TO ACCOUNTABILITY INTEREVENTIONS 
CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVEMENT GAPS BETWEEN WHITE, BLACK, AND 
HISPANIC STUDENTS? 
  
 The analysis presented in Chapter 5 examined the importance of student race 
as a determinant of teacher expectations, primarily focusing on four race groups: 
white, black, Hispanic, and Asian students.  This appendix presents additional 
analyses for these race groups as well as results for Native American and multiracial 
students.    
 
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
Education policy such as NCLB was enacted in response to the prevalence of 
the achievement gap, namely the black-white test score gap.  Table 5.3 presented 
findings where math teacher expectations were regressed on student race and 
accountability interventions.  Table C1 restricts the analysis to black and white 
students only and re-estimates the models to investigate whether teachers’ responses to 
black and white students are stronger than the findings in Table 5.3 suggest.  The 
results presented in Table C1 show that teachers still expect black students to complete 
fewer years of schooling than their white peers.  Teachers in states that use 
accountability interventions also fail raise their expectations of black students.   
The findings presented in Table 5.2 show that the determinants of math teacher 
expectations differ by student race.  By contrast, the analysis presented in Table 5.3 
uses the full analytic sample, and includes interaction terms between race and 

















Table C1: Math Teacher Expectations Regressed on Race, Accountability 




















 Accountability Intervention: 
Early Implementer 

















    
 Accountability Intervention: 
Performance Assessment Test 

















 Accountability Intervention: 
Norm-Referenced Test 

















    
 Accountability Intervention: 
Criterion-Referenced Test 



























 Accountability Intervention: 
Exit Exam 

















    
 Accountability Intervention: 
Testing Index 

















    
    
Student Characteristics    
Teacher Characteristics    
School Characteristicsa    
9th Grade GPA     
Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: The data are weighted by the NCES post-stratification weight (BYSTUWT) multiplied by the 
inverse probability of having non-missing information for the primary explanatory variable, math 
teacher expectations.  N = 6,305 students enrolled in 536 schools.   

















Table C2: Accountability Intervention Coefficients from Regression Models 

































 Accountability Intervention:  
Early implementer 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Unadjusted Model .13 .34 .13 -.33 
 (.10) (.16) (.20) (.33) 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student and teacher  .09 .28 .06 -.13 
characteristics (.07) (.16) (.21) (.29) 
Model 2: Unadjusted Model + school 
characteristicsa 
-.07 .28 -.01 -.35 
 (.09) (.18) (.21) (.33) 
Model 3: Model 1 + school characteristicsa .01 .22 -.04 -.32 
 (.07) (.17) (.22) (.30) 
Model 4: Model 3 + prior academic performance .10 .47 .16 -.09 
 (.07) (.16) (.18) (.23) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Performance Assessment Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Unadjusted Model .14 -20 .25 -.34 
 (.11) (.17) (.22) (.30) 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student and teacher  .09 -.23 .13 -.30 
characteristics (.07) (.16) (.23) (.24) 
Model 2: Unadjusted Model + school 
characteristicsa 
.14 -.22 .32 -.31 
 (.09) (.17) (.22) (.26) 
Model 3: Model 1 + school characteristicsa .11 -.26 .22 -.20 
 (.07) (.15) (.25) (.24) 
Model 4: Model 3 + prior academic performance .11 -.18 .02 .07 
 (.06) (.14) (.22) (.21) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Norm-Referenced Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Unadjusted Model -.28 -.25 -.18 .05 
 (.09) (.16) (.17) (.24) 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student and teacher  -.24 -.23 -.16 .08 
characteristics (.06) (.14) (.17) (.19) 
Model 2: Unadjusted Model + school 
characteristicsa 
-.21 -.31 .18 .01 
 (.08) (.16) (.25) (.21) 
Model 3: Model 1 + school characteristicsa -.18 -.24 .05 .01 
 (.06) (.14) (.24) (.19) 
Model 4: Model 3 + prior academic performance -.22 -.25 -.09 -.14 






Sources: State-Level Accountability Characteristics and the Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  
Notes: See Table 5.1 notes. 
a Region is not included as an adjustment variable. 
 
 
 Accountability Intervention:  
Criterion-Referenced Test 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Unadjusted Model .17 -1.55 .09 1.64 
 (.21) (.48) (.58) (1.23) 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student and teacher  -.04 -.86 .27 2.19 
characteristics (.14) (.43) (.61) (1.21) 
Model 2: Unadjusted Model + school -.28 -1.08 .12 1.52 
characteristicsa (.18) (.42) (.61) (.92) 
Model 3: Model 1 + school characteristicsa -.20 -.68 .30 1.78 
 (.13) (.41) (.60) (1.00) 
Model 4: Model 3 + prior academic performance -.00 -.70 .21 .88 
 (.12) (.43) (.53) (.27) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Exit Exam 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Unadjusted Model .13 -.06 .06 -.10 
 (.09) (.18) (.20) (.27) 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student and teacher  .04 .00 .02 -.04 
characteristics (.06) (.16) (.20) (.23) 
Model 2: Unadjusted Model + school -.03 .05 -.01 -.15 
characteristicsa (.08) (.18) (.17) (.25) 
Model 3: Model 1 + school characteristicsa -.03 .07 -.02 -.31 
 (.07) (.16) (.18) (.23) 
Model 4: Model 3 + prior academic performance .07 -.03 .08 -.05 
 (.07) (.16) (.17) (.18) 
     
 Accountability Intervention:  
Testing Index 
 White Black Hispanic Asian 
Unadjusted Model -.06 -.09 -.03 .10 
 (.05) (.07) (.09) (.11) 
Model 1: Unadjusted Model + student and teacher  -.10 -.07 -.05 .07 
characteristics (.04) (.06) (.09) (.08) 
Model 2: Unadjusted Model + school -.06 -.09 .10 .08 
characteristicsa (.05) (.07) (.10) (.10) 
Model 3: Model 1 + school characteristicsa -.10 -.08 .06 -.02 
 (.04) (.06) (.10) (.09) 
Model 4: Model 3 + prior academic performance -.07 -.08 .06 -.03 




expectations are regressed on accountability interventions and the adjustment 
variables, separately for each race group.  The results presented in Table C2 differ 
slightly from the results presented in Table 5.3, but follow a similar pattern.  
 
NATIVE AMERICAN AND MULTIRACIAL STUDENTS 
Table C3 presents the means and standard deviations for Native American and 
multiracial students (see Table 5.1 for the corresponding information for white, black, 
Hispanic, and Asian students).   Similar to black and Hispanic students, Native 
American and multiracial students trail their white counterparts academically.  
However, both groups have similar socioeconomic status as white students.  On 
average, Native American students attend smaller schools than the other groups.   
Table C4 presents the coefficients when math teacher expectations are 
regressed on the student, teacher, and school predictor variables, and Table C5 
presents the math teacher expectations coefficients for models for three outcome 
variables: tenth grade math test, twelfth grade math test, and math gains (i.e. 12th – 
10th grade math test scores).  Neither Table C4 nor C5 presents a model that adjusts 
for school fixed-effects because the sample sizes are too small and the students are 


















Table C3: Means and Standard Deviations of Primary Variables of Interest, Separately 

























 Native American  Multiracial 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Achievement Test Scores      
IRT estimated number right (10th grade)  35.87 11.29  39.91 13.34 
IRT estimated number right (12th grade) 38.84 14.47  44.94 14.95 
Gain Score (12th – 10th grade) 4.29 6.27  5.43 6.57 
Math Teacher Expectations (in years) 13.62 2.06  14.60 2.00 
Female .47   .48  
Family Background      
Mother’s education (in years) 13.64 2.26  13.56 2.21 
Father’s education (in years) 13.54 2.54  13.69 2.65 
SEI score of mother’s occupation in 2002  47.57 13.18  44.95 12.82 
SEI score of father’s occupation in 2002  42.65 11.96  43.95 11.94 
Family income (natural log) 10.47 1.07  10.60 .90 
Two-parent family .65   .67  
Academic Past      
Learning disability .16   .15  
Ever in remedial math .12   .13  
Ever held back  .20   .15  
Ever have behavior problem .06   .10  
Academic Track      
General .47   .44  
Vocational .13   .11  
Teacher Characteristics      
Female .42   .53  
Black .02   .07  
Hispanic .05   .03  
Asian .04   .08  
Native American .06   .02  
Multiracial .00   .02  
Age (in years) 43.32 12.21  42.69 11.21 
Certified degree or higher .46   .56  
Teaching Experience (in years) 12.13 9.52  13.78 10.57 
Urbanicity      
Urban .17   .29  
Rural .35   .19  
Region      
Northeast .07   .21  
South .21   .27  
West .43   .31  
School Characteristics      
School enrollment 1083.62   1542.03 895.56 
Full-time teachers 61.26 41.59  85.74 44.43 
Percent minority 39.53 29.30  39.75 30.84 
Percent free-lunch 27.41 18.43  21.12 14.87 
Percent college prep 54.56 35.90  52.14 29.43 
Percent general track 63.79 29.93  55.00 33.98 
Percent vocational track 25.94 28.65  16.91 18.61 
Percent remedial math 9.97 7.73  6.51 8.51 
9th Grade GPA 2.36 .84  2.55 .78 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2004 waves)   
Notes: N = 71 Native American and 438 multiracial students for all base-year wave variables. N = 50 


















Table C4: Math Teacher Expectations Regressed on Student, Teacher, and School 

















 Model 1  Model 2 
 Native 











Family Background      
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Teacher Characteristics      




































      
Constant 13.89 14.93  12.81 14.96 




Table C4: Continued 
 Model 3  Model 4 
 Native 











Family Background      
















































Past History      






























































































































Table C4: Continued 
 Model 3  Model 4 
 Native 
American Multiracial  
Native 
American Multiracial 










































School Composition      




































































      
Constant 12.06 15.15  12.79 14.94 
R2 .7199 .4027  .7652 .5090 
Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 wave)  





Table C5: Math Teacher Expectations Coefficients from Regression Models 
Predicting 10th and 12th Grade Math Test Scores and Math Test Gains, Separately for 
Native American and Multiracial Students 
 Outcome Variable:  10th Grade Math Test  
 Native American Multiracial 




















   
 Outcome Variable:  
12th Grade Math Test  
 Native American  Multiracial 




















   
 Outcome Variable:  
Math Gain (12th – 10th Grade Math Test) 
 Native American Multiracial 




















Source: Education Longitudinal Study (2002 and 2004 waves)  
Notes: The tenth grade math test score models are weighted by the NCES post-stratification weight 
(BYSTUWT) multiplied by the inverse probability of having non-missing information for the primary 
explanatory variable, math teacher expectations.  The twelfth grade math test score and math gain score 
models are weighted by the base-year adjustment weight multiplied by the inverse probability of being 
enrolled in the twelfth grade and being in the same school as the base-year wave at the time of the 2004 
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